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Current Topics.

The Annual Meeting.

A NUMBER of matters of interest and importance were discussed or referred to at the annual meeting of the Law Society on the 4th inst. The question of debt and rent collecting on commission, or for a percentage remuneration, has been under the consideration of the Council, and the President stated that the Council are advised that such an arrangement is unobjectionable provided it excludes the taking of legal proceedings. As to land transfer, it appears that it is still too early for the Council to make any announcement. They have had a good many communications with the Lord Chancellor, but these have been confidential. At the same time, Mr. SAMPSON strongly hinted that developments might be expected. Politics apart, we may express the hope that Lord HALDANE will be in office long enough to give these developments a chance. The year, which has been sadly marred by the death of Mr. ELLETT, has been a busy one for the Council, and much useful work has been done. Perhaps there was a greater disposition at the meeting to recognize this than has sometimes been the case. The position of solicitors has advanced enormously, and, no doubt, will advance, and while the Council, like every other body of the kind, is not superior to criticism, the criticism which is useful is that which will help the Council in its work. It is unfortunate, both on professional and social grounds, that there is to be no provincial meeting this year.

The Late Mr. Lyttelton, K.C.

MR. LYTTELTON's untimely death at the comparatively early age of fifty-six will be universally regretted by both branches of the legal profession. A nephew of the late W. E. GLADSTONE and a close friend of Mr. BALFOUR, Mr. LYTTELTON was a fine specimen of the very best type of English gentleman; his courtesy and uprightness of conduct under all circumstances won for him general respect both at the bar and in the House of Commons. To these qualities of heart and disposition he added that all-round genius for athletic sports which invariably wins amongst Englishmen an esteem not always accorded to mere intel-

lectual ability. At the bar Mr. LYTTLETON devilled for Sir HENRY JAMES, whose political follower he also became, for, like his chief, he joined the Unionist wing of the Liberal party in 1886. After some years of a considerable legal practice, during which he took silk and was appointed to the Recorder-ship of Oxford, he entered the House of Commons, and in 1903 became Secretary of State for the Colonies. While serving in that capacity there devolved upon him the uncongenial duty of defending the Chinese Labour Ordinances relating to the introduction of coolies into the South African mines; it was obvious that some unforeseen results of the system—the outbreak of Oriental vice among the coolies and the illegal system of corporal punishment which came accidentally into existence—caused much distress to his humane and candid temperament; and during the last few years he ceased to take a very prominent part in politics. Unlike Mr. ASQUITH in 1895, he did not return to active practice at the bar after having held Cabinet rank, although, we believe, he occasionally appeared in a case presenting special features of social or public interest. He was certainly a distinguished example of the maxim *Mens sana in corpore sano*, the type of man who reflects credit upon any profession of which he may happen to be a member.

Branch Public Trustee Offices.

THE FACT that the Public Trustee is advertising for applications for the appointment of deputy public trustee at Manchester, indicates an extension of his activities. The Public Trustee Act, 1906, contemplates in section 14 (1) the establishment of branch offices, and Rule 42 of the Public Trustee Rules, 1912, provides that the Public Trustee may in writing authorize any deputy public trustee to exercise, either generally or in relation to any particular case, any of the powers and duties of the Public Trustee except certain specified powers and duties. Rule 43 provides that a deputy public trustee shall not, except with the consent in writing of the Public Trustee, act as solicitor to a trust subject to his administration. The rules seem, therefore, to contemplate that the deputy public trustee will be a solicitor, and also that he will not be expected to give his whole time to the duties of the office. Hitherto there has apparently been no necessity for branch offices, but they will naturally be required if the business of the Public Trustee extends.

The Proposed Extension of the Powers of the Public Trustee.

IN CONNECTION with the establishment of branch public trustee offices it may be noticed that there is a Bill in Parliament for the establishment of a public trustee for Scotland. Hitherto it has been supposed that Scotland had all that was required in the system of judicial factors. Strong evidence in favour of this system was given before the Select Committee on Trusts Administration which reported in May, 1895, and it was the basis of the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896. That Act, however, only postponed for a time the establishment of the Public Trustee in this country, and apparently the judicial factor is to be replaced by the Public Trustee in Scotland. The Bill follows the lines of the Public Trustee Act, 1906, and makes provision for the administration of small estates, but it omits the provision for the appointment of the Public Trustee as custodian trustee. There is also before Parliament a Bill to amend the Public Trustee Act, 1906, which is intended to enable the Public Trustee to eject the existing trustees, when he is satisfied that all the persons for the time being beneficially interested desire that he shall become the sole trustee; and he may satisfy himself of this by the statutory declaration of any person appearing to have personal knowledge of the facts. The Bill is referred to in the recent report of the Council of the Law Society. "The Council," so runs the report, "object to these proposals, and have so informed the Lord Chancellor; they consider that powers such as these should be exercisable, if at all, only by the court and for special cause shewn." No doubt this is so. The court will remove trustees, even where there has been no breach of trust, if this is for the benefit of the trust; the principles on which it acts are laid down in *Letterstedt v. Broers* (9 App. Cas. p. 386), and *Re Wrightson* (1908, 1 Ch. pp. 801-3); but the attempt of the Public Trustee to arrogate this power to himself should be strenuously resisted.

The Scott Will Case.

IT is difficult for anyone not present at a trial to form a critical opinion of the effect of the evidence, especially when the evidence is given at great length; but probably no one familiar with the doctrine of undue influence as applied to wills was surprised at the failure of the attempt to invalidate the late Sir JOHN SCOTT'S will on this ground (*Times*, 8th inst.). The mere fact that the legatee had acquired unbounded influence over the testator, even though such influence should, in the view of third persons, be extremely unfortunate, is not sufficient to invalidate the bequest to her. There must, as was pointed out by Sir JAMES HANNEN in *Wingrove v. Wingrove* (11 P. D. 81), be coercion such as to compel the testator to make a disposition which he does not wish to make. "It is only when the will of the person who becomes a testator is coerced into doing that which he or she does not desire to do, that it is undue influence." Coercion in this sense, when the testator is in the full enjoyment of his faculties and is under no physical compulsion, is almost impossible; though there may be coercion when he is in *articulo mortis*, or is otherwise deprived of free volition. But whatever circumstances may amount to coercion in particular cases, there seems to have been no evidence to shew that Sir JOHN SCOTT'S will was made under coercion, and the verdict of the jury in favour of the will was the natural result of the trial.

Discovery between Co-Defendants.

TWO RECENT cases affecting discovery are of such importance in practice that it is worth while shortly to draw attention to the points decided; at some future date we may comment more fully on the principle involved. In *Birchall v. Birch Crisp & Co.*, and *others* (Court of Appeal, June 20th), the Court of Appeal (SWINFEN EADY, L.J., dissenting) held that Order 31, rr. 12 and 14, only authorizes an order for discovery against one defendant at the instance of another when there is some right to be adjusted between the co-defendants in the action in such a sense that, as a result of the decision, that matter would be *res judicata* as between those co-defendants. Here the plaintiff sued the defendant, JACKSON, as assignor to him of an aliquot share in commission payable to JACKSON by the other defendants, BIRCH, CRISP & Co. The latter defendants (1) denied the plaintiffs' rights as against JACKSON, and (2) alleged that they had a claim against JACKSON for misrepresentation, which they were entitled to set-off against his commission. BIRCH, CRISP & Co. made an application for inspection of certain documents named by JACKSON in his affidavit of documents; this was refused by WARRINGTON, J., who was upheld by the majority of the Court of Appeal, on the ground that there was no "right to be adjusted in the action" as between the co-defendants, so as to bring the case within the principle of *Shaw v. Smith* (1886, 18 Q. B. D. 193). The result of this decision would appear to be that the mere existence on the pleadings of some issue between the co-defendants is not in itself enough to entitle one to discovery as against the other; there must be something more, namely, the certainty that such issue, when decided, will operate as *res judicata* between those co-defendants, and not merely between plaintiff and defendants.

Discovery by Next Friend.

ANOTHER and quite different point under Order 31 rr. 12 and 29, arose in *Pink v. J. A. Sharwood & Co. (Limited)* (1913, W. N. 211). Here EVE, J., held that, where a person of unsound mind sues by his "next friend," the latter is not a "party" to the action, and therefore cannot be ordered to make an affidavit of documents. So long ago as 1885 a similar rule in respect of an infant's "next friend" was laid down by PEARSON, J. (*Dyke v. Stephens*, 1885, 30 Ch. D. 189); but after that decision rule 29 was added making the order apply to the "next friend" of infants, but saying nothing about the "next friend" of lunatics. Probably the reason for this omission is that MALINS, V.C., in *Higginson v. Hall* (1879, 10 Ch. D. 235), had already held that, in the case of lunatics, the next friend was "on broad principles" the proper person to make the affidavit. Whatever the reason may have been, however, the fact remains that under the added Rule 29, an order for discovery can be made

against the infant's next friend, while nothing is said about the lunatic's next friend. EVE, J., took the view, therefore, that Order XXXI. must have intended to distinguish between the two, and that the maxim *inclusio unius exclusio alterius* compelled him to hold that discovery is not now available against the next friend of the lunatic. It is submitted, however, that this interpretation of Rule 29 is unnecessary; the Rules Committee, when they made that rule, must have known that lunatics had been held to come within the existing rules, whereas infants had been held to be outside the rules; accordingly they altered the rules so as to include the latter. If, by so doing, they have excluded the former, the result is, indeed, Gilbertian.

The Apportionment of the Increase of Licence Duties.

AN APPEAL from the judgment of Judge BRAY, in the case of *Walney, Combe, Reid, & Co. v. Berners* (ante, p. 611), has been very quickly heard by the Divisional Court (*Times*, 5th inst.). The learned county court judge, it will be remembered, held that an intermediate lessee of a free public-house could not pass on to his superior lessor, by virtue of section 2 of the Finance Act, 1912, any part of the increase of the licence duties under the Finance Act, 1910. Both the Act of 1910 and that of 1912 provide for the licence-holder passing a part of the increase on to others. The Act of 1910 deals, in section 46, with tied public-houses, and entitles the licence-holder to recover a part of the increase, proportionate to the benefit arising from the tie, from the person to whom the house is tied. The Act of 1912 deals with free houses, and enables the lessee to recover a part of the increase, proportionate to the increased rent of the premises as licensed premises, from the lessor. Under the earlier Act no question arises of throwing the burden further back than the first stage. It is a matter solely between the brewer and the licence-holder, and the increase in the duty is shared between them. Under the later Act the terms are "lessor" and "lessee," and these suggest that each successive lessee in an ascending scale can pass part of the burden on to his immediate lessor. Judge BRAY adopted the ordinary meanings of the terms, and allowed section 2 to have this effect. It is expressed to apply where licensed premises are "held" under a lease, and this term is as appropriate to an intermediate as to the occupying lessee; and the Legislature having used such language, the learned county court judge did not concern himself with the effects which might be produced; the intermediate lessee might, for instance, be entitled to deduct more from his lessor than he himself allowed to his own lessee. But we pointed out, when first discussing the question (ante, p. 141), that the language of the section seems to contemplate only a single apportionment, and this view has now been taken by the Divisional Court (RIDLEY and COLERIDGE, JJ.). The section, like section 46 of the Finance Act, 1910, is framed with a view to giving relief to the actual licence-holder; and when this has been done, and a part of the increase transferred to his immediate lessor, the section is exhausted. The successive deductions as between lessees and their superior lessors would raise questions of considerable difficulty, and if this had been intended by the Legislature, definite provision would doubtless have been made, similar to that in respect of the compensation charge under the Licensing Act, 1910, s. 21 (3). Apparently, the matter is to be taken to the Court of Appeal, but, in view of the state of its business, that court has declined to expedite the hearing of the appeal, and attempts to claim a share of the duty from superior lessors will, doubtless, remain for the present in abeyance.

Bills of Sale of Trade Goods.

IN THE case of *Hollingshead v. P. & H. Egan (Limited)* (*Times*, 4th inst.) the House of Lords have adopted the principle of *Re Ginger* (1897, 2 Q. B. 461), and have held that the existence of a bill of sale over trade goods does not prevent their being in the order and disposition of the grantor as the reputed owner, and consequently, on his subsequent bankruptcy, the title of the trustee in bankruptcy will prevail over that of the grantee. The present appeal was from Ireland, and it was at first held in that country, in *Re Stanley* (17 L. R. Ir. 487), that, owing to the statutory restriction on seizure by the grantee contained in section 7

of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, the goods could not be said to remain in the possession of the grantor with the consent of the true owner—that is, of the grantee; but, in fact, the grantee of the bill of sale, by taking it with the statutory restriction, consents to this restriction having its due effect, and therefore consents to the goods remaining in the order and disposition of the grantor. This view, which was taken in *Re Ginger* (supra), has been affirmed by the House of Lords. Some difficulty is caused by the provision of section 7 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, that the grantee shall not seize the goods until, amongst other matters, the bankruptcy of the grantor. This seems to imply that on bankruptcy he may seize, and the seizure is futile if a better title has accrued to the trustee in bankruptcy. But it has been held that the section, while recognizing the right of seizure, does not defeat the title of the trustee. The trustee's title, it may be observed, only accrues in England where the goods are trade goods in the reputed ownership of the grantor, and as to other goods the seizure on bankruptcy would be effectual. In Ireland the distinction between trade goods and other goods does not exist, and the goods in the present case were household furniture. It follows that where the goods are trade goods, and are not saved by a custom or other circumstance negating the reputation of ownership, the bill of sale affords no security in England, and the decision makes all bills of sale in Ireland useless in the event of bankruptcy.

The Public Rights of Way Bill.

THERE is frequently great difficulty in establishing the legal existence of public rights of way, notwithstanding that the exercise of the right can be proved as far back as living memory. The existence of the way depends on dedication, actual or presumed, and there are often technical objections to presuming a dedication, especially when the land affected has been in settlement during the period covered by the exercise of the right. For dedication implies that the person dedicating was, at the time, absolute owner and *sui juris*. The Public Rights of Way Bill, which has been introduced in the House of Lords by Lord EVERSLEY, and has passed through Committee, is intended to remove some of these difficulties, and to make it easier for the public to retain rights of way which have been used for a considerable time. Clause 2 provides that where a way has been actually enjoyed by the public without interruption for twenty years, dedication shall be assumed, unless there is sufficient evidence arising during that period negating the intention to dedicate, or unless, during such period of twenty years, there has not, at any time, been a person in possession capable of dedicating the way; and where the way has been enjoyed for forty years, dedication will be assumed conclusively, unless there is sufficient evidence arising during that period, negating the intention to dedicate. In this latter case, apparently, the existence of a settlement will not prevent dedication, though this result might be more clearly expressed. But an owner will be able to negative the intention by putting up a notice to that effect. The Bill is the same as one which passed the House of Lords two years ago, but for which, since it was in the hands of a private member, time could not be found in the House of Commons. The Government, it appears, have now promised that if the Bill passes the House of Lords they will treat it as a Government Bill in the House of Commons, and endeavour to find time for it; and even if it is not passed this year, they are pledged to introduce it as a Government Bill next year. At the present time it is largely a matter of chance whether a particular right of way can be maintained at law, and it is of importance that all possible rights of this nature should be secured. Owing to the supineness of the Local Government Board and other authorities, the public highways are likely soon to cease to be of service for pedestrians, and the tendency to devote large areas of ground close to towns to golf is responsible, we fear, for reducing the land over which it has hitherto been permissible to pass. If the present Bill succeeds in keeping the country open, it will be of great benefit.

The Money-Lenders Bill.

THE MONEY-LENDERS Bill, which was introduced by Lord NEWTON in the House of Lords, has completed the Committee

stage in that House; and on the second reading Lord HALDANE said that, if it met with a favourable reception in the House of Commons, it would have the assistance of the Government there. Hence, it is probable that it will become law in the present session. It is a short Bill of four clauses only, the first and fourth being formal. The second clause re-enacts with alterations section 2 of the Money-Lenders Act, 1900, and clause 3 prohibits the sending of money-lending circulars. The changes proposed in section 2 are confined to the mode of registration. Under the existing section a money-lender must register himself as such "under his own or usual trade name, and in no other name." This will be altered to "under a name which comprises his own name and his usual trade name (if any), and in no other name." This is an obvious protection to borrowers, and it is singular that the Act of 1900 did not require the registration of the actual name. The money-lender will not be debarred from using a trade name, but he will be bound to reveal his identity. And a new paragraph is introduced requiring that a body corporate, which requires to be registered, shall have the words "Money-lending Company" as part of its corporate name. Banks and insurance companies, and companies which *bona fide* carry on any business not having for its primary object the lending of money, are exempted from registration by section 6 of the Act of 1900, but there are, we believe, companies, not of the usual money-lending type, which make a business of lending money, and which require to be registered. To such companies the proposed change may cause inconvenience, and it may be questioned whether this part of the Bill is really required. Clause 3 proposes that "a money-lender shall not send, or directly or indirectly cause to be sent, to any person any written document which directly or indirectly invites that person to borrow money except in response to a written request received from that person within the preceding seven days"; and a breach of this provision is to be punishable on summary conviction as provided by section 2. It will be remembered that "writing" is defined by the Interpretation Act, 1889, to include printing and other modes of reproducing words in visible form; so that the circular side of the money-lender's activity will be closed, to the great loss, we fear, of the Post Office, but to the gain of the community at large.

Definition of a Trade-Mark.

THE CONSTRUCTION of the words "a trade-mark shall mean a mark used or proposed to be used upon or in connection with goods" in section 3 of the Trade-Marks Act, 1905, arose in the recent case of the *Neuchatel Asphalte Company's Trade-Mark* (30 R. P. C. 349). The *Neuchatel Company* in 1911 applied for the registration of a trade-mark for asphalte. They were, under an agreement which expires at the end of 1925, precluded from dealing with asphalte in this country, and therefore could not use the trade-mark in this country until the agreement expired, although they intended to use it as soon as the opportunity for so doing arose. The application came before SARGANT, J., who refused it. He held that the words "used or proposed to be used" mean "used or proposed to be used in this country"; that "proposed" referred to some present intention to use; that there was no present intention by the company to use the mark, and that the intention to use in 1926 was too remote.

Keeping a Dog Under "Control."

WHAT IS the meaning of "control"? was a question asked in a case which came before the police magistrate at Westminster in a case under "The Dogs Act, 1871." The Act authorizes a police officer to take possession of any dog that he has reason to suppose to be savage or dangerous, straying on any highway, and not under the control of any person, and if it appears to a court of summary jurisdiction, having cognizance of the case, that the dog is dangerous, the court may make an order directing it to be kept under proper control or destroyed. In the case referred to, a summons had been taken out against a lady for not keeping a ferocious dog under control, and the magistrate, after evidence had been given that the dog had bitten several persons, made an order that the dog should be kept under control for twelve months. The defendant asked,

"What does control mean?" And the magistrate replied, "I cannot tell you, a judge of the High Court perhaps may define it." The question would appear to be one of fact, to be determined in each case by the justices. In a case which came before the Divisional Court some years ago, the late Lord COLERIDGE suggested that, as a general rule, a dog could not be considered to be under control unless it were muzzled or led by a string. This rule will scarcely be accepted by a large proportion of the owners of dogs, and, as long as the particular animal is kept out of mischief, there is not likely to be much inquiry as to the means by which the public safety is preserved.

Certificate of Validity under Section 35 of the Patent Act, 1907.

It is perfectly well settled that the granting of a certificate, under section 35 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1907, that the validity of the patent came in question in an action for infringement, is entirely in the discretion of the judge; but on what grounds the judge should exercise his discretion is not settled. It would be a good thing for litigants if it could be, but having regard to the variety of circumstances under which the question arises this would be almost, if not quite, impossible. It arises, not infrequently, where, in the course of a trial, the action is compromised, and judgment is taken by consent. The point arose in *Cloughton v. Foster*, which came before Mr. Justice BYRNE in 1904 (21 R. P. C. 17). There the case was settled, before the examination of the plaintiffs' witnesses was concluded, upon terms that an injunction should be awarded, but that the plaintiffs should grant the defendant a licence at a royalty. BYRNE, J., refused to give a certificate of validity, his view being that section 31 of the Act of 1883, which corresponded with section 35 of the Act of 1907, only applied when the case had been fought out, and not when it had been compromised.

This, however, has not been followed by other judges. The latest case of the kind is *Gerhold v. Radnall* (30 R. P. C. 283). There an action for infringement came on for trial, and during the cross-examination of the first witness for the plaintiff, who was an expert witness, the case was settled, and by consent judgment was given for an injunction without costs. The plaintiff applied for a certificate of validity, which, after some discussion, was granted, the learned judge saying, in effect, that he followed the decision of Mr. Justice COLLINS in *Delta Metal Co. v. Maxim Nordenfellt, &c., Co.* (8 R. P. C. 847), but that the case before him was a stronger one, because *prima facie* evidence had been given as to validity, and the particulars of objections had been put to the witness. The point arose also in 1912 in the case of *Ferguson Superheaters v. Askern Coal, &c., Co.* (29 R. P. C. 431), where, at the close of the examination of the first witness for the plaintiffs, judgment for the plaintiffs was taken by consent, and NEVILLE, J., after some discussion, granted a certificate of validity. A comparatively recent case on this subject is *Robertson v. Standard Piston Ring, &c., Co.* (27 R. P. C. 266). There, in an infringement action in Scotland, after the record had been closed and the proof fixed, the parties came to an arrangement, and no part of the proof was ever taken. An interdict was granted by consent, but without costs. Lord GUTHRIE, granted a certificate of validity, and in doing so remarked that he saw no sign of collusion in the case.

We think that it ought to be, if it is not at present, the settled practice, that where a defendant who has challenged the validity of a patent by his pleadings, appears at the trial, contests the case up to a certain point, and then consents to judgment, a certificate of validity should be given, unless the tribunal is satisfied that the action is a collusive one, and where the defendant fights the case at the trial, it is difficult to see how there can be collusion. But suppose a defendant, who has put in issue the validity of a patent by his pleadings, does not appear at the trial, and after evidence has been given on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff obtains judgment, there is a chance of the action being collusive, and on this ground, in the case of *Gall v. O'Neill* (27 R. P. C. 18), EVE, J., refused to give a certificate of validity. Here, again, it cannot be said that the

practice is settled, because in a similar but earlier case of *Brookes & Co. v. Lyett* (20 R. P. C. 390) BUCKLEY, J., granted a certificate. In a case of this sort, however, we do not think that the certificate should be refused unless there is something to shew that the action is in fact collusive, and that mere suspicion that it is so is not, or ought not to be, enough.

Wife's Domicil in Divorce.

ONE general rule, with regard to proceedings in an English court to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage, is that the matrimonial domicil must be English. Another general rule is that by matrimonial domicil is meant the domicil of the husband, and the wife cannot acquire a separate domicil for herself. The expediency of these rules has been a good deal canvassed in recent years. Sir FRANCIS PIGGOTT tells us that problems arising from cases where there is a conflict of law are "somewhat over-complicated by the theory of a fictitious state of being, called 'domicil,' which at times threatens to become unmanageable." Mr. DICEY, on the other hand, says that "the modern Continental doctrine of preferring nationality to domicil, so logical and simple on the face of it as to have captured most of the legislatures and jurists of Europe, has really led to far more confusion than it prevents."

The hold of the domicil rules on the English courts, is, however, beginning to weaken. The hardship sometimes inflicted by a rigid adherence to these rules was much discussed in the case of *Ogden v. Ogden* (1908, P. 46), and though this case itself had really nothing to do with any question of domicil, the discussion that took place and the observations made in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which was delivered by the late Lord GORELL, have had an important effect on subsequent cases. *Ogden v. Ogden* was a husband's suit for nullity, on the ground that the wife was already married. The marriage was declared null and void by the Court of Appeal, since the wife's previous marriage was held not to have been affected in the English courts by reason of the same marriage having been pronounced null and void in the French courts. What the Court of Appeal said, in effect, was that by English law the previous marriage stood good, notwithstanding that by French law it had been declared null. The wife had been legally married in England to LÉON PHILIP, a Frenchman. On that marriage being declared null by the French courts, the wife (Mrs. PHILIP) took proceedings in the English courts to have the marriage dissolved; but it was held by Lord ST. HELIERS that the English court had no jurisdiction, owing to PHILIP's domicil being French. This constituted the great hardship of the case, but Lord ST. HELIERS' decision was not appealed against, and in England Mrs. Philip remained a married woman, as determined by the Court of Appeal in *Ogden v. Ogden*. It was, of course, useless for Mrs. PHILIP to apply to the French courts, since they would have refused to recognize her marriage or her claim to its dissolution. In view of this extraordinary position, some suggestions were made in the concluding part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal as to the possibility of preventing such hardship in the future as was then suffered by Mrs. PHILIP: "With regard to the decision dismissing the appellant's suit for divorce, it may be observed that her position after the French decree, and after PHILIP had left her and married again, would be intolerable unless some remedy in her favour existed, for by reason of the conflict of laws, she would be a wife in England and not a wife in France; and in regard to such an observation it may not unreasonably be suggested that the remedy may be to allow her to obtain a divorce in England." This could be done, Lord GORELL went on to say, by treating Mrs. PHILIP "as having a domicil in her own country, which would be sufficient to support a suit" for divorce. This, of course, was merely a suggestion and a *dictum* on a point not arising in the case then before the Court of Appeal. The suggestion, however, has borne fruit.

In *Stathatos v. Stathatos* (1913, P. 46), a case similar to Mrs. PHILIP's case in *Ogden v. Ogden* came before BARGRAVE DEANE, J. A Greek, of foreign domicil, married in England a domi-

ciled Englishwoman, deserted her, and obtained from a Greek court a decree of nullity of marriage. The wife presented a petition for dissolution in the Probate Division, and was fortunate enough to obtain a decree. The learned judge adopted the *dicta* and suggestion of the Court of Appeal, though with much hesitation. He held that the wife had, since the court of her husband's domicil had deprived her of all claim on her husband, "reverted to her own domicil, and thereby acquired a right to sue in the court for breaches of the marital relations committed by the husband." At the same time it was said: "It is undoubtedly giving the go-by to what has always been the rule of law and practice here, namely, that the wife's domicil is the husband's domicil, whatever that may be."

Stathatos v. Stathatos was decided in November of last year, and another similar case has just been decided in a similar way by Sir SAMUEL EVANS. The reserved judgment in this case—*De Montaigne v. De Montaigne*—was delivered on July 7th. The facts closely resemble those in *Stathatos v. Stathatos*, and also in *Ogden v. Ogden* (so far as regards the French marriage). The marriage was celebrated in England and was valid by English law. Owing to want of compliance with formalities required by French law (the husband being a Frenchman) the French courts declared the marriage null and void. The President reviewed the two cases already referred to, and came to the conclusion that a decree should be made in favour of the petitioner-wife, dissolving the marriage, notwithstanding that the domicil of the husband was French. He said: "The situation is an intolerable one, for the wife, and I think it better, if necessary, to make an exception in a case like this from the ordinary rule of domicil that governs these cases, and give her a decree, as the practical way of giving her the redress to which she is entitled . . . I think it better to make this exception than to adhere to the rigid rule or theory of law in these cases."

Thus both BARGRAVE DEANE, J., and the President consider they are driven to make the new rule (or exception) by the necessities of the case, since to decide otherwise "would be a disgrace both to our law and our practice." But as long ago as 1859 Lord CRANWORTH thought there might be "exceptional cases" where a wife could claim a separate domicil, "as, for instance, where the husband has abjured the realm, has deserted his wife, and established himself permanently in a foreign country, or has committed felony and been transported": *Dolphin v. Robins* (7 H. L. C. at p. 419).

With the decision of BARGRAVE DEANE, J., and the President before him, it is improbable that any judge of first instance will now hold that *Stathatos v. Stathatos* and *De Montaigne v. De Montaigne* are not to be followed. It is certain that the Court of Appeal would incline in favour of upholding them, supported as they are by the *dicta* in *Ogden v. Ogden*. There is thus a fair probability that a judicial escape from a very great hardship has been found. There is the less reason for quarrelling with this piece of judge-made law, in that it consists merely of allowing an aggrieved spouse to take proceedings which otherwise could not be taken, and does not really affect any large general principle of law.

Reviews.

Death Duties.

THE DEATH DUTIES, COMPRISING ESTATE, SETTLEMENT ESTATE, LEGACY, SUCCESSION AND INCREMENT VALUE DUTIES. WITH DECIDED CASES, FORMS AND NOTES ON PRACTICE. By ROBERT DYMOND, of the Estate Duty Office, Somerset House, Solicitor. Jordan & Sons (Limited). 10s. net.

This book contains a very useful statement in compact form of the nature and practical operation of the various death duties. As Mr. Dymond observes in his preface, the importance of the death duties as a tax on capital and as a source of revenue has been largely increased by recent legislation, and the technicalities of the incidence of the legacy and succession duties on the one hand, and estate duty on the other, have evolved a system of considerable complexity. The work deals in the first three parts with these duties successively, and Part IV. gives a short account of increment value duty payable on the "occasion" of death. The size of the book forbids the inclusion of the full text of all the statutes, and the author has avoided references to superseded duties, repealed law and obsolete

decisions. His object has been to state the actual law so as to give within the compass of one moderate sized volume an explanation of all the duties. But the text is furnished with detailed references to the statutes and to the decisions, and the utility of the work is enhanced by a very full index.

As is well known, the incidence of the duties—especially, perhaps, estate duty—raises in practice questions of no little arithmetical nicety, and not the least useful feature of Mr. Dymond's book will be found in the examples with which he continually illustrates his exposition. Examples of this will be found in cases where the interest in respect of which estate duty is payable is only a partial interest in the property (p. 47), or where the duty requires to be apportioned between real and personal estate (p. 60). And troublesome calculations may have to be made where the interest on part of the duty must be borne by a person entitled for life only, of which an example will be found at p. 109. So, again, the chapter on the rates and amount of estate duty contains useful illustrations of the working of the principle of aggregation. The book is likely to have considerable value to practitioners.

Copyhold Enfranchisement.

THE PRACTICE IN ENFRANCHISEMENTS UNDER THE COPYHOLD ACT, 1894, AND IN REDEMPTIONS OF QUIT RENTS AND OTHER PERPETUAL CHARGES UNDER THE CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1881. By GEORGE WILLIAM LLOYD, LL.B., Barrister-at-Law, Head of the Tithe and Copyhold Branch of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. Stevens & Sons (Limited). 5s.

This work gives in popular style, but not omitting reference to the chief authorities, an account of the nature of copyhold and of manorial incidents, and the steps to be taken in order to procure enfranchisement. The number of enfranchisements effected through the Board of Agriculture and its predecessors has been considerable—some 22,000 altogether—but there are no reasons of convenience for continuing copyhold tenure and its extinction should be hastened. At the present time it is an interesting survival with very inconvenient incidents. Mr. Lloyd states the recent proposals for legislation on the subject, including the recommendation in the Final Report of the Land Transfer Commission, issued in 1911, that the tenure should be abolished by means of enfranchisement within a period of about twelve years. He usefully explains the procedure in voluntary and compulsory enfranchisement, and the section dealing with valuation for the purpose of fixing the compensation contains practical information as to the mode of valuation and the incidents requiring to be dealt with.

Private Companies.

TREATISE ON THE CONVERSION OF A BUSINESS INTO A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY. WITH ANNOTATED FORM OF MEMORANDUM AND ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS ACT, 1907. By CECIL W. TURNER, Barrister-at-Law. THIRD EDITION. The Solicitors' Law Stationery Society (Limited). 6s.

A large number—probably the majority—of the companies which are formed are private companies, and Mr. Turner, in the work of which a third edition has now been issued, explains the various matters requiring attention when the proprietors of a business desire to obtain the benefits of limited liability. References to the cases he leaves to larger works, and confines himself to practical exposition, with such references to the statute law as are essential. A chapter has been added on Reduction of Capital, and the text and forms have been revised and brought up to date. The chief point in connection with a private company is the restriction to be placed on transfer of shares. In his form of articles Mr. Turner follows the usual course of allowing transfers freely between members, but imposing the obligation of offer at a fair value to members before sale to outsiders. The notes appended to the various clauses of the articles usefully explain their operation.

Equity.

THE STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. By CHARLES THWAITES, Solicitor. FOURTH EDITION. Geo. Barber. 5s.

This work is one of a series of guides to the Bar Final. It contains a suggested course of reading; test questions on Messrs. Indermaur and Thwaites' Manual of Equity; and, lastly, a digest of questions and answers. The leading topics of equity are administration, trusts, mortgages, specific performance, and partnership, and the book gives the student ample opportunity of testing his knowledge on these. It includes, also, references to recent cases, such as *Cloutte v. Storey* (1911, 1 Ch. 18), which is quoted in the answer to 'What is a fraud on a power?'

Executors and Trustees' Accounts.

THE ACCOUNTS OF EXECUTORS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND TRUSTEES. WITH A SUMMARY OF THE LAW IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO ACCOUNTS. By WM. B. PHILLIPS, of the firm of John R. Burne & Phillips, Manchester, A.I.C.A., A.C.I.S. Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons (Limited). 3s. 6d. net.

It is essential, Mr. Phillips points out, for persons called upon to act as executors or administrators to understand their various duties, the law governing the subject, and the way in which they should keep the accounts. Perhaps the last matter is the most important, and it is the subject of this book, reference being made to the other matters only so far as is necessary to enable the accounts to be properly kept. Useful chapters are inserted as to the preparation of the estate duty account, and the calculation of the duty payable, and also (chapter 7) on apportionment between capital and income. This chapter contains clear and practical explanations as to the necessary apportionments in respect of dividends, and in respect of wasting property and unauthorized investments, and of reversionary property, with reference to *Howe v. Lord Dartmouth* (7 Ves. 147) and to the recent cases on retention of investments and on reversionary interests, such as *Re Chaytor* (1905, 1 Ch. 33.) and *Re Earl of Chesterfield's Trusts* (24 Ch. D. 643). The later chapters explain the system of keeping the accounts according as the estate is to be divided immediately or is held in trust. The book has been prepared in a useful and practical manner.

Books of the Week.

Divorce.—Browne and Watts' Law and Practice in Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. Eighth Edition. By J. H. WATTS, Barrister-at-Law. Sweet & Maxwell (Limited). Stevens & Sons (Limited). 28s.

Land Transfer.—The Land Transfer "Scandal." The Interests of the Public v. The Tyranny of Officialdom. By J. S. RUBINSTEIN. Third Edition. Sweet & Maxwell (Limited). 2s. 6d.

Selden Society.—Year Books of Edward II., Volume 8. The Eyre of Kent, 6 and 7 Edward II., A.D. 1313-1314, Volume 3. Edited for the Selden Society by WILLIAM CRADDOCK BOLLAND, Barrister-at-Law. Volume 29 for the year 1913. Bernard Quaritch.

Correspondence.

Assignment of Policies.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter.]

Sir,—In reply to a notice of assignment of a policy, The Australian Mutual Provident Society has written that "When a claim is made under the policy the title will be investigated. Should the assignees, however, wish the assignment recognized before any claim arises, they must pay the cost of an examination of the deed by the society's solicitors."

May we suggest it would be advantageous to English insurance companies to follow such an example? Most of us have felt how unsatisfactory it is to have to assure a client that there is no means of getting his title recognized by an insurance company until death, unless perhaps he wishes to raise a loan from the company upon the policy.

MARK LANE.

July 7.

Unnecessary Oaths.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter.]

Sir,—Your remarks under this heading in the current issue lead me to inquire why it should be considered necessary to have death duty accounts sworn to, having regard to the penalty clauses in the various statutes. Furthermore, why should such accounts have to be signed in many places instead of at the end only, and is it really necessary to repeat the affidavit in subsequent accounts with the usual statements that the accounts shew this and do not shew that? The forms might be greatly simplified if they stated at the commencement by whom, in what capacity, and in respect of what estate they were furnished, and, after setting out the usual details, were simply signed at the end.

FRANCIS R. BERGH.

13, Walbrook, E.C., July 5.

Extinguishment of Title.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter.]

Sir,—In the report of *In re Fox, Brooks v. Marston*, in this month's Law Reports (1913, 2 Ch. 75), I am surprised to find no reference to section 10 of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, which deals with money charged on land and secured by an express trust.

The case seems to have been decided under section 8 of the Act of 1874 and section 34 of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833, but under both those sections the fact that there was an express trust would seem to prevent the application of the statutes. (See an interesting note in Paterson's Practical Statutes for 1874, p. 144.)

The position in *In re Fox* is rather curious. The mortgagee had been out of possession for a longer period than the mortgagee, yet the mortgagee's claim was held to be good, while the mortgagee was held to be barred by the statutes. That result would appear to follow from section 10 of the Act of 1874, to which I have referred, but apart from that section I have great difficulty in understanding the case. W. H. W.

July 8.

[Is not the effect of section 10 to get rid of the express trust as a ground for excluding the statutes and to leave them to their ordinary operation? Hence, where a sum of money is charged or payable out of land and secured by an express trust, the person entitled to the money has no extension of time as against the owner of the land by reason of the trust; but we are not aware that this has ever been thought to apply to the entire proceeds of sale of the land, and where land is devised on trust for sale the trustee cannot set up the statute against the beneficiary. The proceeds of sale are not a "sum of money" payable out of land; they represent the land itself. But, as between the beneficiary and his mortgagee, the mortgage debt is a sum of money payable out of "land," since the interest in the share of proceeds is "land,"—this was the point in *Re Fox*—and accordingly the debt is barred and the mortgagee's title extinguished in twelve years.—Ed. S.J.]

Super-tax on Aggregated Incomes of Husband and Wife.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter.]

Sir,—It appears, by a letter from Sir H. Fairfax Lucy published in the *Times* of the 20th ult., that for the purposes of super-tax the Commissioners claim the right to aggregate the respective incomes of a husband and his wife. Super-tax is imposed by section 68 of the Finance Act, 1910, and sub-section 6 of section 72 makes the provisions of the Income Tax Acts relating to the persons chargeable and to the collection of duty applicable to super-tax. The question, then, whether the Commissioners are justified in aggregating the respective incomes seems to depend on section 45 of the Act of 1842; and it is on this section, I take it, that the Commissioners rely for their authority to aggregate the incomes for the purposes of income-tax. First, the section renders a married woman, entitled to property or profits for her separate use, chargeable to such and the like duties as if she were unmarried, so that a married woman in receipt of income exceeding £160 would pay duty on that amount, or if not exceeding £160 she would be exempt. The section also enacts that she is to be chargeable "in like manner" (with the exception afterwards mentioned) as if she were unmarried. The exception is this, that when she is living with her husband, her profits shall be deemed the profits of her husband, and the same shall be charged in the name of the husband, and not in her name or of her trustee. If there were a general clause to the effect that for the purposes of income-tax the income of a married woman shall be deemed to be the income of her husband, there would, I admit, be a good deal to be said in favour of the practice of the Commissioners of aggregating the incomes. But the section, after imposing the duty on the separate income of a married woman, is clearly concerned with the collection of that duty so imposed. If the Legislature intended to levy the duty on the aggregated income, it has not used words sufficiently explicit to bring that about.

Difficulty, I admit, may arise owing to the express exemption of the earnings of a married woman when the total joint income of husband and wife charged to income tax does not exceed £500: see the Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vict. c. 24, s. 5 (1). It may be that the Legislature, by this subsequent legislation, must be taken to have assumed that the construction which has been placed in practice on section 45 of the Act of 1842 is the true one. What effect this may have had upon the question of the right to aggregate the incomes it is not altogether easy to say. If the section is free from ambiguity, it is difficult to believe that the subsequent legislation, purporting to give relief from the taxation of the aggregate incomes, which (apart from such relieving legislation) has no legal justification, can have the effect of legalizing such a form of taxation. If the section be ambiguous, the answer to the difficulty is not clear.

The case of *Bowers v. Harding* (1891, 1 Q. B. 560; 60 L. J. Q. B. 474) turned on the fact that the salary paid to the husband and his wife was joint, and it was impossible to allocate any aliquot portion to either one or the other. The reference made by Baron Pollock to section 45 was no decision in favour of aggregation.

H. C. H.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

House of Lords.

Re W. H. HARVEY—HOLLINSHEAD AND ANOTHER v. P. & H. EGAN (LIM.). 21st April; 3rd July.

BILL OF SALE—BANKRUPTCY OF GRANTOR BEFORE FIRST INSTALLMENT ACCRUES DUE—PROPERTY WHETHER IN HIS ORDER AND DISPOSITION WITH CONSENT OF GRANTOR—IRISH BANKRUPT AND INSOLVENT ACT, 1857 (20 & 21 VICT. C. 60), s. 313—BILLS OF SALE (IRELAND) ACT, 1879; AMENDMENT ACT, 1883 (46 VICT. C. 7), s. 7.

Held, following In re Ginger—Ex parte London and Universal Bank, (1897, 2 Q. B. 481; 46 W. R. 144), that the goods comprised in a bill of sale are in the order and disposition of the grantee "by the consent and permission of the true owner" within the reputed ownership clause (section 44 (2)) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, although the consent of the grantee—as the true owner—was involuntary by reason of his being prohibited from seizing the goods by section 7 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882.

Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Ireland) setting aside a decision of Boyd, J. By a bill of sale dated the 2nd of June, 1911, W. H. Harvey assigned certain chattels, mostly his household furniture by way of security for the payment of £75 and interest in respect of a debt incurred by him to Messrs. P. and H. Egan (Limited) for goods supplied. Harvey agreed to pay the amount secured by the bill of sale by two equal instalments of £37 10s., on the 1st of December and the 1st of June, 1912, and it was provided that the chattels should not be seized for any cause other than specified in section 7 of the Bills of Sale (Ireland) Act, 1879. On the 15th of August, 1911, before the date, therefore, when the first instalment became payable by Harvey under the bill of sale, Harvey was adjudicated a bankrupt on the petition of one Hollinshead, and Michael Conway was appointed creditors' assignee. A motion was made that the goods and chattels in Harvey's possession should be sold for the benefit of his creditors.

Boyd, J., held that the bankrupt at the time he became bankrupt had, by the consent and permission of the true owner, in his possession the goods and chattels comprised in the schedule to the bill of sale, of which goods and chattels the bankrupt was the reputed owner, and ordered that they might be sold for the benefit of his creditors. In so holding he followed the case of *In re Ginger, Ex parte The London and Universal Bank* (1897, 2 Q. B. 461).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the order of Boyd, J. Hence this appeal.

THE HOUSE took time for consideration.

Their LORDSHIPS (Earl LOREBURN and Lords ATKINSON and MERSEY) held that the decision of Boyd, J., was right. The bill of sale, which was practically in statutory form, contained the following proviso: "Provided always that the chattels hereby assigned shall not be liable to seizure or to be taken possession of by P. and H. Egan (Limited) for any cause other than those specified in section 7 of the Bills of Sale (Ireland) Act, 1879, Amendment Act, 1883. That Act was practically identical in its terms with the English statute of the previous year, the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, Amendment Act, 1882, and therefore, following the rule laid down in *Ginger's Case* (supra) the goods and chattels were assets which the trustee in the bankruptcy could properly realize for the benefit of the creditors, notwithstanding the claim of the grantees under the bill of sale, which was in order, and had been duly registered. Appeal allowed with costs.—COUNSEL, for the appellants, Ronan, K.C., Edw. Clayton, K.C., Robt. Doyle, K.C., and P. F. Denning; for the respondents, Cave, K.C., Blood, K.C., and Stephen O'Brien. SOLICITORS, Ellis & Ellis, for Hoey & Denning, Dublin; Hamtins, for T. Conway, Dublin.

[Reported by EMMERIE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

NATIONAL TELEPHONE CO., LIM. (in Liquidation), AND ANOTHER v. HIS MAJESTY'S POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 3rd June; 4th July.

PRACTICE—APPEAL—RIGHT OF APPEAL—DECISION OF RAILWAY AND CANAL COMMISSION UNDER TELEGRAPH (ARBITRATION) ACT, 1909.

By an agreement between the National Telephone Company and the Postmaster-General all questions and matters of difference between them in connection with the purchase of the company's undertaking were to be referred to the Railway and Canal Commission, if that body should be authorized to entertain them. The Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909, conferred this power and imposed the duty upon the Railway and Canal Commission. The Commission having determined the matters in difference between the parties, the Postmaster-General appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The National Telephone Company raised a preliminary objection to the appeal being heard, on the ground that the matter came before the Commissioners as arbitrators and not as a court. The objection having been over-ruled (Buckley, L.J., dissenting), the question of jurisdiction was raised in this House, the appeal on its merits standing over pending the decision of this House on the question of competency of jurisdiction.

Held, that the decision of the Court of Appeal (29 L. T. R. 190) was right.

Semble. The decision of the Court of Appeal is not final in such a matter, and an appeal can be heard by this House.

Appeal by the National Telephone Company against the decision of the Court of Appeal (Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Kennedy, L.J., Buckley, L.J., *dissentiente*), holding that the determination of a matter of a difference which that body was authorized to entertain by virtue of Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909, and which had been referred to them under an agreement between the National Telephone Company and the Postmaster-General, was decided by them as a court and not as arbitrators, and therefore that an appeal lay from their determination to the Court of Appeal. The Postmaster-General's appeal to the Court of Appeal was directed to stand over pending this appeal to their lordships' bar. There was also a cross-appeal by the Postmaster-General against the present appeal being heard on the ground that no appeal lay from the Court of Appeal to their lordships' House. The cross-appeal having been stated as a preliminary objection, the House decided to hear the appeal before deciding the cross-appeal.

The LORD CHANCELLOR said they were unanimously of opinion that the preliminary objection to this appeal being heard, argued by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Postmaster-General, could not succeed, and that this House was entitled to hear and determine the appeal by the National Telephone Company. They would dismiss both appeals and give their reasons later.

July 4.—Their lordships gave their reasons for dismissing the appeal and cross-appeal.

LORD HALDANE, L.C., having stated the facts, said the ground of the objection was that the Commission had jurisdiction only by virtue of the agreement and of the Telegraph Arbitration Act, 1909, and not under the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, as amended by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, neither of which Acts by itself applied to the case. The seventeenth section of the Act of 1888 gave a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, excepting where the questions were of fact or of *locus standi*; but it was said that the Telegraph Arbitration Act enabled a reference to the Commission, not as the Court of Record established under the two general Acts referred to, but as a body of arbitrators from whom there is no appeal. Section 17 (5) took away the ordinary right of appeal to this House from decisions of the Court of Appeal in cases of appeal to it from the Commissioners, and the Attorney-General contended that in consequence the appeal now brought to this House was incompetent. In his opinion that preliminary objection failed. The real question was whether the judgment of the Court of Appeal was a nullity, and not whether that court erred in a proceeding competent under section 17 of the Act of 1888. He thought that in such a case there was nothing to take away the general right of appeal to the House of Lords conferred by section 3 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876. The substantial question in the case turned on the construction of sections 1 and 2 of the Telegraph Arbitration Act of 1909. It was contended by the appellants that, in a reference under this Act, the Commission was not in the same position as in a reference under the general Acts establishing it, and that, as no right of appeal was expressly given, none could be presumed. In his opinion the contention of neither party could be upheld, and therefore the appeal failed, and the judgment of the court below would be affirmed with costs.

LORDS LOREBURN, ATKINSON, SHAW, MOULTON, and PARKER gave judgments to the like effect.—COUNSEL, for the National Telephone Company, Sir Alfred Cripps, K.C., Danckwerts, K.C., and H. H. Gaine; for the Postmaster-General, The Attorney-General (Sir Rufus Isaacs, K.C.), The Solicitor-General (Sir John Simon, K.C.), S. O. Buckmaster, K.C., G. S. Schoobe, and Branson. SOLICITORS, W. E. Hart; The Solicitor to the Post Office.

[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

COMMISSIONERS OF INLAND REVENUE v. TRUMAN, HANBURY, BUXTON & CO. (LIM.) AND ANOTHER.

LICENSING ACTS—ANNUAL LICENCE VALUE—MODE OF FIXING—FINANCE (1909-10) ACT, 1910 (10 EDW. 7, C. 8), S. 44—REVENUE ACT, 1911 (1 GEO. 5, C. 2), S. 8—JULY 7.

A licensed public house was held upon lease at a rent from the proprietors, and was subject to a tie for the purchase of malt liquor. The public-house did some business as an eating house.

Held, restoring the judgment of Hamilton, J., that under the provisions of section 44 (2) of the Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910, in arriving at the annual licence value the increased value arising from the extra profits derived from the sale of eatables and non-intoxicants attributable only to the fact of their being sold on licensed premises should be taken into consideration, and therefore that the Court of Appeal (Kennedy, L.J., *dissentiente*) were wrong in holding that the whole of the profits derived from the sale of eatables and non-intoxicants should be taken into consideration.

Decision of Hamilton, J. (reported 28 T. L. R. 381) restored; judgment of Court of Appeal (*ibid.* 553) reversed.

Appeal by the Commissioners from an order of the Court of Appeal, dated the 20th of July, 1912, which varied, and in part reversed, an order of Hamilton, J., dated the 22nd of April, 1912, made on petition of the respondent company at the High Court under section 44, sub-section 2, of the Finance Act of 1910. The question at issue was what, under that section—which runs: "In estimating for the purposes of the Act the value, as licensed premises, of hotel or other premises used for purposes other than the sale of intoxicating liquors, no increased value arising from profits not derived from the sale of in-

toxicating liquors shall be taken into consideration"—was the annual value of the fully-licensed public-house known as the "Eagle," in Great College-street, Camden Town, of which the respondent company are the owners and Mr. Edwin Warden the licensee.

Hamilton, J., held that the annual value of the premises, apart from the proviso in section 44 of the Finance Act of 1910, was £1,545, and that, in arriving at the annual licence value, the increased value arising from the extra profits derived from the sale of non-intoxicating liquors and eatables should not be taken into consideration, leaving the question of abatements for profits to be ascertained subsequently, failing agreement of parties. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal, where Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Farwell, L.J., Kennedy, L.J., *dissentiente*, allowed the appeal so far as regards the value arising from profits not derived from the sale of intoxicating liquors, and the finding that no part of the profits derived from the sale of non-intoxicating liquors and eatables were to be taken into consideration, and that the annual licence value should be reduced to £1,148. Against this judgment the Commissioners of Inland Revenue appealed to the House of Lords. The appeal was first argued on the 10th, 11th, 14th, and 15th of April, before the Lord Chancellor and Lords Atkinson and Parker, and judgment reserved. The parties were then informed that the case was to be reargued, and the appeal was heard on the 6th, 9th and 10th of June, and judgment again reserved, before the Lord Chancellor, Lords Loreburn, Atkinson, Shaw, Moulton and Parker.

July 7.—Their lordships gave judgment, holding that on the true construction of sub-section 2 of section 44 of the Finance Act, 1910, the premises known as the "Eagle" public-house fell within the words "hotels or other premises used for purposes other than the sale of intoxicating liquor"; that the words "increased value" in the same paragraph of that section meant increased value due to the licence used, arising from profits not derived from the sale of intoxicating liquor, and they ordered that the appellants and respondents should each bear their own costs. Accordingly the appeal was allowed without costs.—COUNSEL, for the Inland Revenue, the Attorney-General (Sir Rufus Isaacs, K.C.), the Solicitor-General (Sir John Simon, K.C.), and Lowenthal; for the respondent company, Sir Alfred Cripps, K.C., Ryde, K.C., and Konstam. SOLICITORS, The Solicitor to the Inland Revenue; Godden, Son, & Holme.

[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

Court of Appeal.

CALICO PRINTERS' ASSOCIATION v. BCOth. No. 1. 7th July.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1906—REDEMPTION OF A WEEKLY PAYMENT UPON APPLICATION OF EMPLOYER—PERMANENT INCAPACITY—"MAY REDEEM"—AWARD OF LUMP SUM BY ARBITRATOR—SCHEDULE I. (17).

A workman met with injury by accident in the course of his employment necessitating the amputation of his left hand, and received half wages for six months. The employers applied to redeem the weekly payment, and the arbitrator, holding that the injury caused permanent incapacity, made an award in which he said, "The employers may redeem" on payment of £613. The employers refused to accept this award on the ground that the incapacity was not proved to be permanent, and contended that under it they had an option within Schedule I. (17) to continue the weekly payment.

Held, that they were obliged to redeem by payment of the sum awarded.

Appeal of the applicant, and cross-appeal of the employers, from an award of the county court judge at Ashton-under-Lyne. The applicant was engaged in adjusting a carding machine, when, according to his own evidence, the machine without apparent cause started off of its own accord, taking off four fingers from his left hand. The injury necessitated the amputation of his hand. The employers made a weekly payment of half-wages, being 15s. 4d. per week, for over six months, and then applied to redeem the payment, but contended that he was still able to do work which would enable him to earn £1 a week, and therefore that his incapacity was not permanent. The arbitrator took a different view, and awarded a lump sum of £613, calculated as being 75 per cent. of the value of an annuity of 15s. 4d. for the rest of his life, in accordance with the rules of the Post Office Savings Bank, but his award simply said "the employers may redeem" on payment of £613. The employers refused to redeem, and the appellant appealed. The employers contended that the award meant only that they might, if they chose, redeem on payment of £613, and that the word "may" in Schedule I. (17) could not be read as meaning "must," and entered a cross-appeal on the ground that there was no evidence on which the arbitrator could properly find that the incapacity was permanent.

COZENS-HARDY, M.R., said that the appeal raised an interesting and important question. There was beyond all doubt an arbitration under the Act, the heading of the case was so worded. The relief sought was redemption of a weekly payment, and that referred to Schedule I. (17) which his lordship read. It provided that an application might be made to the court by the employer only, not the workman. The court first had to consider whether the incapacity was permanent or not, and then an award had to be made on the application submitted. The arbitrator would have to find (1) that the incapacity was permanent, (2) the amount which ought to be awarded calculated according to the rules for valuing an annuity in the Post Office Savings Bank. The arbi-

trator had to insert in his award the amount he had arrived at by the method so employed. The principle of the case had already been decided in *Castle Spinning Co. (Limited) v. Atkinson* (1905, K. B. 336, 7 W. C. C. 124). In that case the employer applied for redemption, and named a certain sum as a maximum limit, but it was there held that the employer must be prepared to pay whatever sum the arbitrator awarded. The word "may," therefore, was clearly negatived by that case. Its use was simply intended to justify the court in entertaining an application to redeem. But once the application was made, and the jurisdiction was invoked, clearly the arbitrator "must award a lump sum. If the incapacity was permanent, he had no discretion as to the amount, and could not award either more or less. He had to make an award for the payment of a lump sum in cash, which could be enforced like a judgment. The applicant's appeal would be allowed.

KENNEDY and SWINFEN EADY, L.J.J., delivered judgment to the same effect.

The employers' appeal on the ground that there was no evidence upon which the arbitrator could find that the applicant's incapacity was permanent, was dismissed, and does not call for any report.—COUNSEL, *Sanderson, K.C.*, and *Wingate Saul*, for applicant; *Sonkey, K.C.*, and *Adshad Elliott*, for employers. SOLICITORS, *Baguley*, Manchester; *F. S. Rhodes & Bethell Jones*, Manchester.

[Reported by H. LANGFORD LEWIS, Barrister-at-Law.]

High Court—Chancery Division.

Re RAYER, RAYER v. RAYER. Neville, J. 20th and 21st June.

SETTLED HAND—POWER TO GRANT MINING LEASES—LEASES GRANTED BY TENANT-FOR-LIFE UNDER THE POWERS GIVEN BY THE SETTLED LAND ACTS—CONTRARY INTENTION—SETTLED LAND ACT, 1882 (45 & 46 VICT. c. 38), s. 11.

Where a tenant for life granted a mining lease not under the settlement, which contained a power for that purpose, but under her powers under the Settled Land Acts, and the court held that there was a "contrary intention" within the meaning of section 11 of the Settled Land Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38), no part of the rents and royalties was ordered to be set aside as capital money.

This was a summons to determine how the accumulations and future rents and royalties under a mining lease were to be applied, having regard to section 11 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, which provides for the application of part of such rents as capital money unless a contrary intention appears in the settlement. A testator, who died in 1892, after appointing trustees, devised his real estate to his trustees for 1,000 years, upon the trusts thereafter declared and subject thereto to his wife for life, remainder to others for life, remainder to the infant defendants in tail. The testator directed his trustees to pay the residue of the rents of his settled estates, after keeping down certain rentcharges, to the person for the time being entitled in remainder immediately expectant on the said term of 1,000 years. In the trusts of the 1,000 years' term powers were given to the trustees to work and open mines, and to sell and accumulate the proceeds, and to hold the same on certain trusts, and after the accumulations should cease to be lawful, to apply such proceeds to the person to whom or in the manner in which the same would be applicable if the same were income arising from his settled estates. Power was also given in the will for tenants for life who should be males to grant mining leases for sixty years, and for the trustees to grant such leases if the tenant for life should be a female or a minor. The testator directed the rents and royalties of the mining leases to be subject to the trusts for accumulations thereinbefore contained. In 1901 the plaintiff, the testator's widow, exercised her power of granting leases, not under the will, but as tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts, and granted a mining lease for sixty years, and the rents and royalties were accumulated in court under the order of the court until January, 1913, when the period for lawful accumulations ceased, being twenty-one years from the death of the testator. Counsel for the plaintiff, the tenant for life, contended that she was entitled to all the rents and royalties arising under this lease, and that no part need be set aside as capital money.

NEVILLE, J., after stating the facts and reading portions of the settlement, said:—This mining lease has been granted under the power contained in the Settled Land Act, and not under the settlement. Accordingly, if a contrary intention as to the application of the rents were expressed in the settlement, it could only refer to this lease by inference and not directly. I think the case of *Re Bagot's Settlement* (1894, 1 Ch. 177) is authority on this point, and in that case it was directly decided that where a "contrary intention" was expressed with regard to the rents derived from mining leases under a power contained in the settlement, that would be a "contrary intention" with regard to the rents arising from a lease granted under the power contained in the Act. The recent case of *in Re Daniels, Weeks v. Daniels* (56 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 519, and 1912, 2 Ch. 90) does not, to my mind, conflict with this decision, because in this latter case there was no power in the settlement to grant mining leases, but merely a direction to pay the rents and profits to the tenant for life. I accordingly follow the decision in *Re Bagot's Settlement* (*ubi supra*), and hold that there is a contrary intention expressed in this settlement, and that the rents arising under the mining lease are to be

applied as part of the rents and profits controlled by the provisions of the settlement, and not in accordance with section 11 of the Act.—COUNSEL, *G. R. Northcote, W. R. Sheldon; E. G. Eardley Wilmot, G. H. Hurst*. SOLICITORS, *Wood, Bigg, & Nash; Withers, Bensons, & Co.; Woodcock, Ryland, & Parker.*

[Reported by L. M. MAY, Barrister-at-Law.]

PINK v. SHARWOOD & CO. Eve, J. 26th June.

PRACTICE—DISCOVERY—PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS—PERSON OF UNSOUND MIND—NEXT FRIEND—FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT AS TO DOCUMENTS—R.S.C., ORD. XXXI. 29.

The court has no jurisdiction to order the next friend of a person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition to make an affidavit as to documents.

Dyke v. Stephens (30 Ch. D. 189) followed.

Higginson v. Hall (10 Ch. D. 235) dissented from.

This was an application that the plaintiff, by his next friend, should file a further and better affidavit of documents. The plaintiff was a person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition, and sued by Joseph Moore, his next friend. Moore had been appointed receiver under section 116 of the Lunacy Act, 1890, some time prior to the issue of the writ. The claim made in the action was for an injunction to restrain an alleged infringement of the plaintiff's trade name and labels used in connection with a business formerly carried on by him. The action had proceeded up to delivery of defence. On the 19th of May, 1913, on the application of the defendants, an order was made "that the plaintiff, by the said Joseph Moore, his next friend, and such next friend do within seven days after service of this order make and file a sufficient affidavit stating whether the plaintiff had in his possession or power any, and, if so, what documents, relating to the matters in question." The defendants alleged that the affidavit was insufficient, and issued this summons for an order that the plaintiff, by the said Joseph Moore, his next friend, should file a further and better affidavit of documents upon the ground that the plaintiff had not disclosed the documents enumerated in the schedule. Objection was now taken, on behalf of the plaintiff, to any order being made on this application on the ground that the order of the 19th of May ought never to have been made.

EVE, J.: The first question which I have to consider is whether the order of the 19th of May was properly made. It was made under Rule 12 of Order XXXI., and the first observation which arises on reading the rule is that the person who has been directed in this case to make the discovery is not a party to the action. Persons under disability, that is to say, infants, persons of unsound mind, and lunatics, can only commence an action by a next friend or committee. In the case of a lunatic the committee and lunatic are both made parties, but this is not so where an infant or person of unsound mind sues by a next friend, and the next friend is not a party to the action. It was on this ground that Pearson, J., decided in *Dyke v. Stephens* (30 Ch. D. 189) that in an action brought by an infant by a next friend there was no jurisdiction to order discovery by the next friend. In coming to that conclusion, Pearson, J., had to consider the decision of Malins, V.C., in *Higginson v. Hall* (10 Ch. D. 235), where in an action by a person of unsound mind suing by his next friend, counsel for the person of unsound mind not disputing that there must be discovery of documents, but expressing a doubt as to who should make the affidavit, the next friend not being a party, the Vice-Chancellor held on broad principles that the next friend was the proper person to make the affidavit. I think it is clear that the conclusions of Pearson, J., and the Vice-Chancellor cannot both be right, and in these circumstances which ought I to follow? I prefer the later decision of Pearson, J. That decision negatives the suggestion that a rule by which power is given to order discovery by a party to the action can be resorted to for the purpose of compelling discovery by a person who is not a party. Since that decision Rule 29 has been added to Order XXXI., and the whole order now applies to infant plaintiffs and defendants and their next friends and guardians. The fact that the added rule is confined to these persons affords some ground for Mr. Clayton's suggestion that this course was probably adopted because there was no need to provide for the case of a person of unsound mind suing by a next friend, seeing that the Vice-Chancellor had already decided that in such a case the next friend could be ordered to make discovery; but I think the Rule Committee must have appreciated that the decisions in *Higginson v. Hall* and *Dyke v. Stephens* could not be reconciled, and that other reasons than the decision in the former case must have existed for not extending Rule 29 to the next friend of a person of unsound mind. Among such reasons may be the fact that one result which follows on the appointment of a receiver or committee is that the property of the person of unsound mind thereupon passes into the control of the Lords Justices, and thereafter it is for them to determine the extent to which, and the circumstances in which, documents belonging to or in the possession of a person of unsound mind are to be disclosed to, and inspected by, persons seeking discovery. There being already means of obtaining discovery in lunacy, it may well have been considered that it was neither necessary nor desirable to add to them by extending Order XXXI. to persons of unsound mind and their next friends. But whatever be the reason, the order does not, in my opinion, include them, and on this ground I come to the conclusion that there was no jurisdiction to make the order of the 19th of May. If the present application were to enforce compliance with that order by writ of attachment or

dismissal of the action, I should feel bound to direct the matter to stand over in order to give the plaintiff an opportunity of moving to discharge the order, but on this application, for a further and better affidavit, I can deal with the matter without first setting aside the order by refusing the application for a further affidavit if I think the first order ought not to have been made. I do think so; and having come to that conclusion I dismiss the present application.—COUNSEL, Clayton, K.C., and Tomlin; P. O. Lawrence, K.C., and Stokes. SOLICITORS, Billing & Co.; Parker, Garrett, & Co.

[Reported by S. E. WILLIAMS, Barrister-at-Law.]

BEBB v. THE LAW SOCIETY. Joyce, J. 1st and 2nd July.

SOLICITOR—WOMAN—RIGHT TO BE ADMITTED TO EXAMINATION—PUBLIC OFFICE—COMMON LAW DISQUALIFICATION—SOLICITORS AND ATTORNEYS ACT, 1843 (6 & 7 VICT. c. 73), ss. 2, 3, 48—SOLICITORS ACT, 1888 (51 & 52 VICT. c. 65), s. 10.

A woman is not a "person" within the meaning of section 48 of the Solicitors and Attorneys Act, 1843, and is disqualified by reason of her sex from being admitted to the preliminary examination for the purpose of qualifying for admission as a solicitor.

In this action the plaintiff, a lady, sought a declaration that she was a "person" within the meaning of the Solicitors and Attorneys Act, 1843, and the amending Acts, and that she was entitled to be admitted to the preliminary examination held by the Law Society under such Acts. The defendants were of opinion that the plaintiff was unfit to be admitted by reason of her sex. The material statutes are as follows: The statute of 1322, 15 Ed. II., which reserved to the Lord Chancellor and Chief Justice the power of admitting attorneys; a statute of 1402, 4 Henry IV. c. 10, which provided that persons were to be shewn to be good and virtuous before they could be admitted as attorneys, these conditions being further extended by the Act of 1615, 13 Jac. 1, c. 7. The Solicitors and Attorneys Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 93), section 2, provides: "No person shall act as an attorney or solicitor, or as such attorney or solicitor, sue out any writ or process, or commence, carry on, solicit or defend any action, suit, or other proceeding in the name of any other person or in his own name . . . unless such persons shall have been . . . admitted and enrolled and otherwise duly qualified to act as an attorney or solicitor under or by virtue of the law now in force, or unless such person shall after the passing of this Act be admitted and enrolled and otherwise duly qualified to act as an attorney or solicitor pursuant to the directions and regulations of this Act." Section 3 imposes the condition that no person shall be admitted unless such person has been bound as a clerk. Section 35 provides that "from and after the passing of this Act in case any person shall in his own name or in the name of any other person sue out any writ or process, or commence, prosecute or defend any action or suit or any proceedings in any court of law or equity, without being admitted and enrolled as aforesaid, or being himself the plaintiff or defendant in such proceedings respectively, every such person shall and is hereby made incapable to maintain or prosecute any action or suit in any court of law or equity for any fee, reward or disbursements, on account of prosecuting, carrying on or defending such action, suit or proceeding or otherwise in relation thereto; and such offence shall be deemed a contempt of court . . . and shall be punished accordingly." Section 48 is: "In the construction of this Act . . . every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male . . ." The Solicitors Act, 1877, governs the existing system of examinations. The Solicitors Act, 1888, section 10, provides that "A person who has obtained from the society a certificate of having passed a final examination may apply to the Master of the Rolls to be admitted as a solicitor; and thereupon the Master of the Rolls, unless cause to the contrary is shewn to his satisfaction, shall by writing under his hand admit, in such manner and form as he shall from time to time direct, such person to be a solicitor." It was argued for the plaintiff that there was nothing in any of the statutes expressly disqualifying a woman: that there was nothing in the nature of the office of a solicitor or attorney which rendered it incapable of being discharged by a woman; before 1322 women had in fact acted as attorneys (Select Civil Pleas, vol. 1, p. 56; Bracton's Notebook, vol. 2, case 342). It was true women were disqualified from holding public offices, but the office of a solicitor was rather in the nature of a private profession. If a woman was admitted to examination, and became qualified, then under section 10 of the Act of 1888 she would have to be admitted. Further, if a woman was not a "person" under section 2 of the Act of 1843, then she was not a person under section 35, and would not be liable to penalties under that section. *R. v. Alice Stubbs* (2 Term Reports 395), *Chorlton v. Lings* (4 C. P. 374), *Bural's Case* (Siderfin, 94), and *Beresford-Hope v. Lady Sandhurst* (23 Q. B. D. 79) were referred to. For the defendants it was contended that there was nothing in the statutes implying that there was to be a change from the ancient custom by which men only are admitted to act as solicitors, and *Nairn v. University of St. Andrews* (1909, A. C. 147) and *Hall v. Incorporated Society of Law Agents* (C. S. Series 5, 3 Fraser 1059) were referred to.

Joyce, J., in giving judgment, said: This is a novel and somewhat startling application. It is an action for a mandamus to compel the Law Society to admit a lady to the preliminary examination with a view to her becoming a solicitor. If the applicant is disqualified by sex from becoming a solicitor, according to our law then the action fails. Now it has been admitted before me—indeed, it could not be denied—that according to the Common Law a woman is incapable of executing a public office or public functions, and in support of that I need only

refer to the case in 23 Q. B. D., where the judgment of Willes, J., is cited by Lord Esher. Now it is said that following the profession of a solicitor is not the exercise of a public office. I am sure I do not know whether it is or not; I am not prepared to say what is the exact effect of the provision in the Judicature Act that solicitors shall be deemed to be officers of the court. I am not sure how far this goes, it has not been mentioned to me, and there may be nothing in it; but I am very much mistaken if a person who is a solicitor is not thereby qualified to be nominated and to act in a public office. I may be wrong, but I think solicitors of some standing and practice are qualified to be masters of the Supreme Court. If that be so, I think that may be a difficulty in the way of this lady. However, that has not been argued before me. The view which I take of the case is this: Notwithstanding the reference made to Bracton, the Mirror of Justice and other authorities or supposed authorities of some remote antiquity, I myself entertain no doubt as to the position of women in reference to this matter before the modern legislation with regard to solicitors. I do not doubt that a woman was, before this legislation, the legislation beginning in 1843, though I think there was an earlier Act in 1831, disqualified by sex from becoming and practising as an attorney or solicitor. I may be wrong; but if I am right, how has that disqualification been taken away? There is no express enactment removing it. It is true there is an interpretation clause in the Act of 1843, section 48, which provides that "any word importing the plural number shall extend and be applied to one person, matter or thing as well as several persons, matters or things; and every word importing the masculine gender shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male. . . . Now, as I indicated before, my opinion is that such a clause as that is only for the purpose of enabling the drafting of clauses to be more concise than it would otherwise be, and I say the same with reference to the interpretation clause. It is not the province of such a clause as that—I am not sure that this has not been said before—to make such a radical alteration of the law as to effect a revolution such as is sought to be effected by this application. That being my view about the interpretation clause, there is no positive enactment which provides that every person, where the word "person" might mean and would naturally mean a female as well as a male, who possesses certain qualifications shall be entitled to be admitted to this examination or even shall be entitled to be admitted a solicitor. There is no indication or suggestion in any statute of any intention on the part of the Legislature to make any alteration in the law with reference to this point, the admissibility of women to the profession of the law. I am of opinion, and feel no doubt, that such a thing was never contemplated or thought of by the framers of any of these Acts. In other words I am certain that it was not the intention of the Legislature to alter the law. That being so, I think the disability which in my opinion existed before the modern legislation still remains, and will continue to remain unless and until the Legislature think fit to interfere and make the alteration which is sought to be brought about. The action in my opinion fails, and must be dismissed. Costs were not asked for.—COUNSEL, for the plaintiff, S. O. Buckmaster, K.C., and R. A. Wright; for the defendants, Hughes, K.C., and Tomlin. SOLICITORS, Withers, Bensons, Birkett, & Davies; S. P. B. Bucknill.

[Reported by R. C. CARRINGTON, Barrister-at-Law.]

Re THE BLAIR OPEN HEARTH FURNACE CO. (LIM.). Warrington, J. 24th and 25th June.

COMPANY—ALLOTMENT OF SHARES—STATEMENT IN LIEU OF PROSPECTUS—EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 82 OF THE COMPANIES (CONSOLIDATION) ACT, 1908 (8 EDW. 7, c. 69), s. 82 (1)—VALIDITY OF ALLOTMENT.

It being contended that mis-statements and omissions in a statement in lieu of a prospectus filed with regard to the formation of a company under section 82 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, rendered void or voidable the allotment of shares.

Held, that the allotment of shares was not avoided, but that a shareholder who applied for an allotment of shares on the faith of the filed statement would have the same rights of rescission as a shareholder who had relied on a misleading prospectus.

This was a motion on behalf of a limited company, called the Canadian Agency (Limited), to have the name of the company removed from the register of shareholders of the Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company (Limited). The Blair Open Hearth Furnace Company (Limited) was incorporated in 1912, but no prospectus was issued. Prior to allotment, however, a statement was filed in lieu of a prospectus. This statement was alleged to contain mis-statements and omissions with regard to matters required to be stated by section 82 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, and by Schedule II. of the Act. It was contended that such mis-statements and omissions rendered the allotment of shares void, or at any rate voidable by the shareholders. Section 82 (1) of the Act is as follows: "A company which does not issue a prospectus on or with reference to its formation shall not allot any of its shares or debentures unless before the first allotment of either shares or debentures there has been filed with the registrar of companies a statement in lieu of prospectus signed by every person who is named therein as a director or a proposed director of the company or by his agent authorized in writing, in the form and containing the particulars set out in the Second Schedule to this Act."

WARRINGTON, J., said that it was a startling proposition that, because the statement filed in lieu of a prospectus contained mis-statements

and omissions, and he assumed for the purpose of his judgment that to be the case, therefore the subsequent allotment of shares was rendered void. In his opinion that was not the true intention of the Legislature. The intention of the Legislature was that where no prospectus was issued, an applicant for shares should be able to inspect some document having a similar object, and any applicant who applied for shares on the faith of the filed statement would have the same individual right of rescission in the case of mis-statement or omission of material facts as he would have had if he had relied on a misleading prospectus. The requirements of the Act about proceeding to allotment were satisfied by the mere filing of the statement, whether the particulars were or were not sufficiently supplied. It was not suggested in the present case that the applicants had ever inspected the statement in question before application and allotment, and the motion must be dismissed with costs.—COUNSEL, *Clouston, K.C., Gordon Brown; Cave, K.C., Gore-Browne, K.C., Sims. SOLICITORS, Linklater, Addison, & Brown; Birkbeck, Yeo, & Co.*

[Reported by J. B. C. TARGATEEN, Barrister-at-Law.]

Court of Criminal Appeal.

R. v. RABJOHNS. 2nd and 23rd June.

CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCE—REMANET FROM LAST SENTENCE—FRESH CONVICTION—PRISONER NOW BOUND OVER—REVOCATION OF LICENCE—PENAL SERVITUDE ACT, 1853 (16 & 17 VICT., c. 99), ss. 9 AND 11—PENAL SERVITUDE ACT, 1864 (27 & 28 VICT., c. 47), ss. 4, 5, AND 9.

R., at the time he committed the crime of arson, was a convict on licence, with a remanet of one year and ninety-five days of his last term of penal servitude unexpired. *R.* pleaded guilty.

Held, that if *R.* was bound over to come up for judgment if called upon, his licence would be revoked, and he should be kept in custody to serve the remanet of his last sentence.

Accordingly Circular L.P. 15, 1912, dated the 8th of November, 1912, and issued from the Prison Commission to the Governors of Prisons is erroneous. This circular directed the governors immediately to release a prisoner on licence who was bound over after a verdict or plea of guilty upon the ground that his licence was not forfeited, as the conviction was not complete until judgment had been passed.

This was an appeal against sentence. The facts and arguments of the case appear sufficiently from the written judgment of the court (Darling, Bankes, and Lush J.J.), which was delivered by Bankes, J., as follows:—

The question for decision in this case has reference to the proper construction to be put upon sections 4 and 9 of the Penal Servitude Act, 1864. The matter arises in this way. The appellant was indicted at the Leeds Assizes for arson. He pleaded guilty. He had been twice previously convicted of the same offence, and sentenced to terms of three years' and five years' penal servitude respectively. At the time he committed the offence of which he pleaded guilty he was out on licence, having a period of one year and ninety-five days of his last term of penal servitude unexpired. Mr. Justice Darling considered that the best way to deal with the appellant was to bind him over to come up for judgment when called upon, being of opinion that the effect of the appellant's plea of guilty was to revoke his licence and to subject him to serve the unexpired portion of his previous sentences. He accordingly bound him over. The attention of the learned judge was then called by the governor of the goal to a Circular L.P. 15, 1912, dated the 8th of November, 1912, and issued from the Prison Commission to the Governors of Prisons, directing them immediately to release a prisoner on licence who is bound over after a verdict or plea of guilty upon the ground that his licence is not forfeited, as the conviction is not complete until judgment has been passed. On his attention being called to this circular, the learned judge recalled the prisoner and sentenced him to a term of penal servitude, giving him at the same time leave to appeal, so that the question raised by the aforesaid circular might be discussed. Upon a consideration of the various statutes dealing with the granting of licences to persons undergoing terms of penal servitude, and of the cases cited during the argument, the court is of opinion that the reason given in the circular for the action to be taken by the governors of the goals is not well founded. Section 4 of the Penal Servitude Act, 1864, provides that "If any holder of a licence granted in the form set forth in Schedule A to the statute is convicted, either by the verdict of a jury or upon his own confession, of any offence for which he is indicted his licence shall be forthwith forfeited by virtue of such conviction." The meaning of the word "conviction" has been discussed in several cases. For instance, in *Burgess v. Boetejeur* (7 M. & G. 481), where the question was as to the meaning of the word "convicted" in the statute 25 Geo. II, c. 36, section 5, and where, after a plea of guilty, judgment had been respited, it was held that the offender was not to be considered as convicted until the judgment of the court upon the indictment against him was pronounced. In that case Tindal, C.J., in giving judgment, says that conviction is undoubtedly *verbum æquivocum*. It is sometimes used as meaning the verdict of a jury, and at other times, in its more strictly legal sense, for the sentence of the court. In the present case the language of the statute itself seems to settle this question, as it uses the words "convicted by the verdict of a jury or upon his own confession," but, apart from this, the judgment of Mr. Justice Stephen in *Jephson v. Barker* (3 T. L. R. 40)

disposes of any possible difficulty, as he there says that a binding over by the court is the judgment of the court for the purpose of completing a conviction. Whichever view, therefore, is taken of the meaning of the word conviction, there has, in the opinion of the court, been a conviction within the meaning of section 4 of the Penal Servitude Act, 1864, whenever a prisoner has been found guilty on indictment by a jury, or on his own confession, and has been bound over to come up for judgment when called on. To this extent, therefore, in the opinion of the court, the circular of the Prison Commissioners expresses an erroneous view of the law. The further question has, however, to be disposed of—namely, whether where a prisoner on licence is convicted on indictment, and merely bound over, there is any power to keep him in custody, or to compel him to serve out the unexpired portion of his sentence. The granting of licences and their forfeiture or revocation appears to be entirely regulated by statute. [After referring to various sections of the Penal Servitude Act, 1853, and in particular to section 9, the learned judge continued:] For the purpose of giving effect to the statute as a whole, the court is of opinion that the words from "after undergoing" to "further" in section 9 should be read as if in parentheses; and the section consequently must be read as providing that the convict shall, in the event of forfeiture or revocation of his licence, undergo the unexpired portion of his sentence, and in the event of his receiving any sentence for the offence which forfeited or revoked his licence, he shall undergo such unexpired portion after the expiration of such sentence. This latter part of the section is directed to providing for the sequence of the punishments in the event of the offender whose licence is forfeited or revoked receiving any sentence of punishment at the time of his conviction. If he receives none, this part of the section does not apply to his case. Read in this way the section covers all the cases that can occur, and the latter portion of it, which applies to every case, provides the machinery by which a person whose licence is forfeited or revoked can be compelled to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence, even though he is only bound over, and not at the time of conviction sentenced to any punishment. For the reasons above stated the court is of opinion that the circular is not justified by the provisions of the Acts of Parliament regulating licences to convicts, and they are of opinion that the course originally proposed to be taken by Darling, J., should be taken in the present case. The decision of the court, therefore, is to allow the appeal against sentence, and to substitute for the sentence an order as originally intended by Darling, J., directing the appellant to be bound over to be of good behaviour for a period of two years from the expiration of the unexpired portion of penal servitude, and to come up for judgment when called upon.—COUNSEL, *Macaskie; A. Morley. SOLICITORS, The Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal; The Director of Public Prosecutions.*

[Reported by O. G. MORAN, Barrister-at-Law.]

New Orders, &c.

The Lunacy Acts, 1890 and 1891.

I, Richard Burdon Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, in pursuance of section 338, sub-section (2) of the Lunacy Act, 1890, and section 27, sub-section (2) of the Lunacy Act, 1891, and of all other powers enabling me in that behalf, do hereby make the following rule:—

In the case of applications, dealing only with benefits under the National Insurance Act, 1911, a number of such applications may be joined in one summons and service of notice of the application may be dispensed with.

July 2, 1913.

(Signed) HALDANE, C.

Societies.

The Law Society.

ANNUAL MEETING.

The annual meeting of the Law Society was held on Friday, the 4th inst., at the Society's Hall, Chancery-lane, the retiring President, Mr. C. L. Sampson (London), taking the chair. Among those present were: Mr. Walter Trower (Vice-President), the Hon. Walter Bernard Louis Barrington, Mr. John James Dumville Botterell, Mr. John Wreford Budd, Mr. Alfred Henry Coley (Birmingham), Mr. Cecil Allen Coward, Sir Homewood Crawford, Mr. Alfred Davenport, Mr. Weedon Dawes, Mr. Robert William Dibdin, Mr. Walter Dowson, Mr. Walter Henry Foster, Sir Edward Henry Fraser, D.C.L. (Nottingham), Mr. Samuel Garrett, Mr. Herbert Gibson, Mr. Charles Goddard, Mr. John Roger Burrow Gregory, Mr. John Waller Hills, M.P., D.C.L., Mr. William John Humfrys (Hereford), Sir Henry James Johnson, the Hon. Robert Henry Lyttelton, Mr. Frank Marshall (Newcastle-upon-Tyne), Mr. Philip Hubert Martineau, Mr. Joseph Farmer Milne (Manchester), Mr. Charles Henry Morton (Liverpool), Mr. Robert Chancellor Nesbitt, Mr. Kenrick Eyton Peck (Devonport), Sir Albert Kaye Rolitt, LL.D., D.C.L., Litt.D., Mr. William Arthur Sharpe, Mr. Richard Stephens Taylor, Mr. William Melmoth Walters, Mr. Robert Mills Welsford, and Mr. William Howard Winterbotham, members of the Council; Mr. Charles Edward Barry (Bristol), Mr. Edward Bramley (Sheffield), Mr. Richard Stewart Cleaver (Liverpool), Mr. Thomas Eggar (Brighton),

Sir Charles Elton Longmore, K.C.B. (Hertford), Mr. John Wessley Martin (Reading), Mr. William Henry Norton (Manchester), and Mr. Norris Alfred Ernest Way (Chester), extraordinary members; and Mr. S. P. B. Bucknill, secretary, and Mr. E. R. Cook, assistant secretary.

PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT.

The PRESIDENT said he had great pleasure in declaring Mr. Walter Trower (London) elected as President for the ensuing year, and Sir Charles Elton Longmore, K.C.B. (Hertford), as Vice-President.

ELECTION OF COUNCIL.

The PRESIDENT said that the following gentlemen had been proposed as candidates for the eleven vacancies on the Council caused by the retirement of ten members in rotation and the death of Mr. Ellett: Mr. Robert William Dibdin (23, Red Lion-square, W.C.), Sir Edward Henry Fraser, D.C.L. (Nottingham), Mr. Charles Goddard (3, South-square, Gray's Inn, W.C.), Mr. Herbert Gibson (9, Great St. Helen's, E.C.), Mr. John Waller Hills, M.P., D.C.L. (Queen Anne's-mansions, Westminster, S.W.), Sir Henry James Johnson (101, Leadenhall-street, E.C.), Mr. Charles Henry Morton (Liverpool), Mr. Robert Chancellor Nesbitt (7, Devonshire-square, Bishopsgate, E.C.), Mr. Charles Leopold Samson (6, Austin-friars, E.C., and Manchester), Mr. William Arthur Sharpe (12, New-court, Carey-street, W.C.), Mr. Alfred John Morton Ball (Stroud, Gloucestershire), and Mr. Arthur George Shaw Robertson (Bath). As, however, the nomination of Mr. Robertson had been withdrawn, the candidates were not more in number than the vacancies, and he declared them duly elected.

AUDITORS.

The PRESIDENT said the following gentlemen had been proposed as Auditors of the Society:—Mr. John Stephens Chappelow, F.C.A. (10, Lincoln's Inn-fields, W.C.), Mr. Mitchell Templeton (9, King's Bench-walk, Temple, E.C.), and Mr. George Arthur Whitfield (22, Surrey-street, Strand, W.C.).

Mr. CHARLES FORD (London) said he would like to repeat what he had said on a former occasion, namely, that he thought the Society ought to have two professional auditors.

The PRESIDENT said that did not arise on the present occasion. He had now only to carry out the bye-law, and declare Mr. Chappelow duly elected. He also declared Mr. Mitchell Templeton and Mr. G. A. Whitfield elected.

ACCOUNTS. ARTICLED CLERKS' FUND.

The PRESIDENT moved the adoption of the accounts.

The VICE-PRESIDENT (Mr. Walter Trower, London) seconded the motion.

Mr. FORD said he should like to acknowledge the courtesy of the Council in adopting suggestions of his with regard to the method of apportioning the sums charged against the general fund and against the articulated clerks' fund, but there was room for improvement still. It was very unfortunate that such large and unfair charges were made against the articulated clerks' fund, with the result that it was found that the expenditure in respect of it exceeded the income. The apportionment was far from equitable, and, if it were equitable, the income would exceed the expenditure. It was unfair to charge the articulated clerks' fund with any part of the voluntary subscriptions of the society to charities, and so on. Then, instead of a third of most of the items being charged against the account, it ought only to be one-fourth. The items which struck him as being more than ordinarily excessive were those of "rates and taxes, £791"; "salaries to officers, clerks, and servants, £2,618"; "printing, stationery, and advertisements, £744"; "house expenses, including water, coal, and lighting, £465"; "insurance on buildings and furniture, £29"; "postage and sundries, £219"; "depreciation on furniture, fixtures, and fittings, £139." He expressed the hope that the Council would pursue the course they had begun in the past, and still more modify these charges.

The VICE-PRESIDENT (as Chairman of the Finance Committee) said he had explained on previous occasions that the method of apportionment had been very closely considered and calculated, having regard to the expenses actually incurred with regard to the administration of both funds. As far as the Council possibly could, they treated, and he hoped would continue to treat, the articulated clerks' fund with the utmost liberality.

The motion was carried.

ANNUAL REPORT. THE LATE MR. ELLETT.

The PRESIDENT moved the adoption of the report. He said he was sure the meeting would like him to begin by expressing the deep grief all of them must feel at the loss of one of their most distinguished colleagues on the Council, Mr. Ellett. A very brief reference had been made to that in the report, but he was sure they would agree that it very inadequately expressed the great loss, not only to the Council and to the Society, but to the whole profession of the solicitors throughout the country, which had been sustained. They all knew the work, the great work, Mr. Ellett did for very many years on the Council, and they must all have appreciated his kindness of disposition and his courtesy of manner, and he thought there were only two things perhaps which might militate somewhat against the sorrow they all felt, namely, the circumstances of his death and the place where he died. Mr. Ellett died in the very fullest possession of his powers, not suffering from any long illness, and he died in a place which, as he (the President) had mentioned to the Council when they first heard of his death, he was sure he would have liked to have died apart from his own home, as

being the place he thought he loved best, apart from his own home—namely, the Law Society. The report dealt with a very great number of matters, and, whatever the opinion of the meeting might be as to the way in which the Council had dealt with those matters, he was sure that they would be satisfied that they had given a great amount of time to the consideration of a number of very important questions affecting the profession. They had dealt with all sorts of subjects, and he was not going to weary the meeting by referring to them in detail. But there were one or two matters which, he was sure, they would like him to refer to, as shewing that the Council had taken great interest in a number of professional questions and, in some cases, with beneficial results to the Society.

SCOTT v. SCOTT.

He would first of all refer to the case of Scott and Scott. As they were all aware, the Society had to appeal to the House of Lords from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which, if it had stood, would have been a menace to the profession. They did so because they recognised that a great terror attached to solicitors if, in the honest discharge of their duties, they could have been subjected to punishment at the caprice, it might be, of a judge, and that they should have no appeal from that decision. He was glad to say that the House of Lords had taken a very common-sense and broad-minded view of the law, and had supported the view for which the Council contended.

ADMISSION OF WOMEN.

There was another matter in which the Council were brought, this time not by their own inclination, but against their will, into a contest in the courts. They had felt themselves bound to resist the attempt which was made by ladies to be admitted as members of the profession. They would all have noticed the result of that. Mr. Justice Joyce had kept their rights immune from ladies, and had held that the view of the Council was right, and that the ladies did not come within the category of persons who were entitled to be admitted solicitors.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

The Council had paid great attention to the proposals to amend the law of bankruptcy, and they contended that, whilst the principles of Cohen and Mitchell should be amended, the law of after-acquired real property should be made equal to that regarding personal property. So far they had not been successful in convincing the authorities upon the matter. The Bill had still to come before the House of Commons, and the Council trusted they were going again to take steps to have their views brought before the Legislature; whether they would succeed or not he did not know.

POOR MAN'S LAWYERS.

Then there was the question of "poor man's lawyers," which had been very much before the Council, and, as would be seen by the report, they had shown themselves very greatly in sympathy with every well-directed organisation for assisting poor people in having their claims investigated and their right claims protected by legal proceedings. Of course, in the carrying out of this intention there were numerous difficulties to be faced, but the Council had had a conference in the Society's hall with a number of societies which, for many years, had been engaged in useful work in this direction, and, acting in concert with them, they had proposed a scheme which, he trusted, might prove to be a practical and working scheme.

COUNSEL'S FEES.

He should like to mention two or three important matters to which, in his address at the provincial meeting at Cardiff, he had drawn attention, and to which the Council had given very careful consideration during his year of office. One of these was the question of counsel's fees, and the Council very strongly urged on the profession that, once a brief had been delivered, they should not listen to any request for an increase of the fees simply on the ground that the gentleman on the other side had a larger fee marked than was the case with their leader. The next question, with regard to counsel's fees, was still a matter of discussion between the Council and the Bar Council. Put shortly, it was that, whilst the Council recognised that, as a general principle, and as a matter of convenience, what was called the two-third's, or the three-fifth's, rule should prevail, they assumed that it should not apply to any fees other than the fees that would be ordinarily paid to a leader for the particular business in which he was engaged—in other words, that if a litigant desired to secure the services of some gentleman who demanded a higher fee, a much higher fee than would be ordinarily paid in similar matters to a less distinguished man, there should be some means found for dividing that fee in such a way that the juniors should only get a proportion of what he would describe as an ordinary brief fee. The Council were in touch now, and had been for some time past, with the Bar Council upon the matter, and, but for the illness of Mr. Lawrence, the chairman of the Bar Council, a meeting would have taken place upon the previous day, and he might have been able to give the meeting some more information upon the subject. He thought that at a very early stage it was likely that they would arrive at some satisfactory settlement of this vexed question.

DELIVERY OF BILLS OF COST.

The next matter was that of the delivery of bills of costs of solicitors. He did not propose to refer to this at any length, because it was fully set out in the report, which showed what the Council had been advised

by counsel as being possible, and he would only like to call the attention of the meeting to the concluding words, where it was stated that:—"In the circumstances, the Council are of opinion that the practice of delivery, as between solicitor and client, of a lump sum bill without priced details and items is a growing and convenient practice, and should be facilitated by allowing the solicitor, in the event of taxation, to supplement the bill by a statement of the nature and amount of the business done, showing the skill, labour, and responsibility involved, but that this cannot be effected without legislation, and they are not prepared to apply to Parliament for the purpose. They desire to draw the attention of members to the course suggested by counsel," which might be properly employed in the delivery of such bills. Of course, in matters not involving litigation, solicitors had power to contract with their clients, but what the Council pointed out was, what they considered a remnant of the past, the necessity of delivering bills by items.

COSTS OF LITIGANTS.

The next point, a very important one, which the Council had to consider, was the disparity between the costs which a successful litigant obtained from his opponent and the costs he had to bear himself. Looking into the matter, the Council came to the conclusion that really no alteration of the law was necessary to effect what they wanted, but that a just appreciation of the existing rule by the Taxing Masters would go a long way to remedy what the litigants had for a long time suffered from. The rule seemed to have been framed in a very wise and judicious manner, and to have aimed at giving the litigant practically an indemnity, except in respect of costs which had been incurred by over-caution and by extravagance, but it was the application of that rule that was the difficulty. However, the Council trusted that, now that they had taken up the matter and gone into it, and approached the authorities, a more wide and general application might be given to the rule than had always been the case in the past.

DEBT COLLECTING BY SOLICITORS.

There was only one other matter he wished to refer to, which did not occur in the report so much, but he might mention it in order to prevent the necessity of making any further remarks about it. It would be remembered that questions were asked in the hall on several occasions, and the last time, at the special general meeting on the 26th January, 1912, by Mr. Brinsley Harper, as to whether it was to be understood that the Law Society considered the collection of debts by solicitors for clients, on the terms of commission being paid on the amount of the debt recovered, as champertous, and, in the opinion of the Council, as unprofessional conduct on the part of a solicitor. He was desired by the Council to make the following announcement:—"The Council are advised that an agreement for the collection of rents, interest, or debts, the remuneration for which is to be a percentage on the amount recovered, and which contemplates litigation, would be an infringement of the law against champerty, and illegal. They are, however, of opinion that such an agreement, if it excludes the taking of legal proceedings, is neither unprofessional nor objectionable."

THE LATE MR. ELLETT.

Mr. J. S. RUBINSTEIN (London) said he thought that everybody present would recognise the truth of the President's statement that he had had a very heavy year of office, and had dealt with a very large number of subjects, and he was sure the Society were deeply grateful to him and to the Council for the very arduous labours they had performed during that period. Rising from the body of the hall, he could not suggest for a moment that it was not with some object of criticising, to an extent, what had been done. But he would re-echo the President's remarks with regard to the late Mr. Robert Ellett. He had felt his death as a personal loss to himself, because Mr. Ellett was the conduit, so to speak, through which he could let the Council know what was passing in his mind. It was always a pleasure to communicate with Mr. Ellett, because of the courtesy with which he had dealt with him, which was such that he might call it exceptional. It was a great grief to the members of the Society, and the death took place very shortly after a general meeting, where, through his kindly intervention, they were able to pass unanimously a motion which he (Mr. Rubinstein) had brought forward.

ANNUAL PROVINCIAL MEETING.

With regard to the annual provincial meeting, he understood that the members would not have the privilege of attending a meeting this year. That was very much to be deplored. He thought those provincial meetings were delightful meetings. They afforded opportunities for London solicitors to meet their brethren in the provinces throughout the kingdom, and they assisted in popularising the Society. He had brought forward a motion at the January general meeting with regard to making some contribution from the Society towards the expenses of the provincial meetings, but he was sorry to say the Council had not been sympathetic. They would not even take the matter into consideration, and the result was apparent in that the Society were not invited into the country this year. He hoped, notwithstanding the fate of that motion, that the Council would now consider whether what he had suggested should not be done. He did not know what provision had been made to give the Society the benefit of the President's address delivered on such occasions. He took it that it was a grievance if the President for the year had not the opportunity of referring to the various subjects which were being discussed relating to the profession, and he should like to know whether the members

could not look forward to having an opportunity of hearing what the new President had to say.

LAND TRANSFER.

The report referred to land transfer, and there were two or three pages of interesting matter, but, from his point of view, without coming to any conclusion which was of any value. There were some very significant words where it was stated that at a meeting of the Land Transfer Committee of the Council and the provincial law societies in that hall in July, 1912, a resolution was passed as follows:—"That this meeting, without pledging itself to details, accepts the principle of the scheme recommended by the Council, on the understanding that it will be proposed as a scheme to be applied by way of experiment in London only, and that opposition will be offered to any proposal to extend compulsory registration of any kind beyond London, except under statutory authority, but that in the county of York a simultaneous experiment should be made on the lines proposed by the Yorkshire society." He would like to take that as his text for what he had to say. The Council were parties to the compromise which was effected in 1897, which they were now deploring. They did not treat the matter very differently from the way in which they were referring to it in the report. Of course, it was ancient history, but still the Council did not treat it properly in the past, and they were not treating it properly in the present. There would not have been compulsion in London to-day, or even years ago when it came into operation, if the matter had been treated properly in 1897, when the Act was passed. Had the Council made a single representation to the authorities to enforce the findings of the Royal Commission that this was an imperfect system, a system which put the purchaser in London at a disadvantage with the purchaser elsewhere, a system so imperfect that they could not recommend its extension? He had attempted to introduce resolutions on more than one occasion calling attention to this point. So recently as the general meeting in April the society passed unanimously a resolution practically re-echoing his opinions. What had the Council done with that resolution, and with other resolutions of a similar character which from time to time had been passed? Before the present Lord Chancellor was in office, he (Mr. Rubinstein) was told that it was absolutely hopeless to attempt to take any action in the matter, and to put their resolutions forward, but that was not the position to-day. The present Lord Chancellor knew something about conveyancing. He was impressed, judging by his reported words, with the fact that this legislative system was not an ideal system. The society should go forward, and, in the first place, urge that the Privy Council should rescind the order for its operation in London. They would succeed in this. It only required a body like the Council to go to the Lord Chancellor to bring it about; but, so far as he could make out, because the Council were somewhat divided in opinion, nothing was done. The country members urged that the subject should be left alone, because they had not got compulsion in their districts. But that was no reason why they in London should leave it alone, and he did say to the Council, who seemed to fall between two stools, that, notwithstanding what the provincial members said, who were not burdened with this harassing system, he urged that it was the duty of the society, having regard to the resolution passed in April, to make a proper representation to the Lord Chancellor.

ADMISSION OF WOMEN.

With regard to the admission of women as solicitors, they had to face the present position. Women were not to-day what they were in his younger days. The report said, "The Council are acting on the view that a woman is not eligible to present herself for examination with the object of being admitted as a solicitor." That was correct, and the courts had upheld that view. The president, by his observations, had expressed pleasure that that was the state of the law. The only point he wanted to make was that they should approach the subject with a more open mind; he thought the matter required reconsideration, for it was ripe for reconsideration. There was no doubt whatever that, almost immediately, a Bill would be introduced into Parliament to give women the right to become members of the legal profession, and the Council would have to decide whether, as a society, they were going to oppose it. He thought it was an error of judgment to have ruled the matter in the way the Council had done.

Mr. FORD said the general feeling of the profession was that it would be disastrous if women were admitted.

SOLICITORS (ADDITIONAL POWERS) BILL.

After referring to the question of Land Transfer, Mr. Ford said, with regard to the Bill before Parliament for extending the Discipline Committee's powers, that one suggestion he was most anxious to make was that every solicitor, whether a member of the society or not, was an officer of the court, and he could not help feeling very strongly that, whilst they had their responsibilities as officers of the court, they should also have the rights which attached to that position. The right that he felt was being taken away very largely was that the solicitor should have the right immediately to remove any matter of complaint from the Law Society into the court of which he was an officer, and he hoped that that would receive serious consideration. He would be told that there was provision in the Bill before Parliament by which the solicitor, or the person complaining, might go to the court, but that was unsatisfactory to his mind. There might be instances in which a member of the profession might be glad to have a case inquired into with closed doors by the society, and, on the other hand, the solicitor

might wish to have the case inquired into in open court, and publicity given to it. The members of the profession should avail themselves of the opportunity of making representations to members of the House of Commons, in order that such an amendment might be introduced into the Bill. One suggestion he would like to make was that, as the Bill was framed, solicitors who had been members of the Council of the Law Society might be appointed to serve on the Discipline Committee of the society for this purpose. He thought also that the word "Wales" ought to be added, as it was a mistake to exclude members of the Council coming from that part of the kingdom. He did not know that Clause 4 should not provide that any member of the society should be qualified to serve, and not merely limit it to members of the Council and ex-members.

SOCIETY'S TEACHING SYSTEM.

He thought there was room for improvement in the teaching system of the society. Of course, the chairman of the committee was conscious of that. The society ought not to act in opposition to the University of London, but in concert with it, and to facilitate all wise proposals which might come from it. He supported the observations which had been made to the effect that the society were certainly under a very considerable debt of gratitude to the Council, who, with all their private practice, gave so much valuable time, not only to the profession, but also to the public.

PROVINCIAL MEETING.

Mr. J. W. MARTIN (Reading), an extraordinary member of the Council said he regretted very much indeed, with Mr. Rubinstein, that the society were not going to have a meeting in the provinces this year. He was one of those who regularly attended these meetings, and he could corroborate the statement that they did a great deal of good to the profession, and they certainly brought new members to the society. It was an exceedingly good advertisement for the society. It had occurred to him that, as the society had not had any invitation to the provinces—he disagreed with Mr. Rubinstein in thinking that the provinces required a grant in aid; he thought the provincial societies were quite capable of entertaining the members without coming to the parent society for assistance—but, as there had been no invitation, why should not London invite the provinces to come to them? He thought the time had arrived when London might very well entertain their provincial brethren. He was in London in the Jubilee year 1887, when London surpassed itself in hospitality, and those coming from the country thoroughly enjoyed themselves. The London members ought to reciprocate the hospitality of the provinces, and invite the country members to come to London, if not this year, certainly next year.

COUNSEL'S FEES.

Mr. J. J. DODD (London) said that the question of refreshers to counsel was an important matter. A little time ago he was fighting a case at the assizes, and counsel had stipulated for very considerable fees, considering the amount of the estate. The trial went on, and counsel demanded their refreshers. He said they were entitled to refreshers according to the scale laid down in the rules, but they said they would not go into court unless their price was paid, and he had to see the counsel in the Bar room. They held up the business of the court whilst the question of refreshers was being settled, and the senior counsel said he was not going to have any fee but that which he had asked. Notwithstanding the character of the demand, he (Mr. Dodd) had to submit, and the executor, who had no personal interest in the estate, might have to pay out of his own pocket the additional fee.

COUNTY COURTS.

With regard to county-courts, he hoped the Council would consider the possibility of having the temporary courts in the quadrangle of the Courts of Justice used for county courts, for the convenience of solicitors and counsel, who could agree to their cases being tried there. It was an intolerable nuisance to have to go to outlying courts and wait until judgment summonses and small cases had been dealt with. He thought there ought to be a county-court clearing house at the Law Courts, where solicitors could get summonses issued, and pay money into court, and so save the running about to the local courts, and enable many solicitors, who could not be bothered with county-court work for their clients, to do that work efficiently, without any interference of the officials who run the courts.

MEMBERSHIP OF SOCIETY.

Mr. J. S. HEPPORTH (London) said he thought it very desirable that every member of the profession should be a member of the society. He suggested that where firms were composed of several partners, each of them should become members. There were firms which had a single partner as a member of the society, and the whole firm got the benefit of the society's publications.

DELIVERY OF BILLS OF COSTS—LAND TRANSFER.

Mr. A. E. BELL (London) said he wished to endorse the remarks which had been made congratulating the Council upon the general tenor of their report; but there was always some element of criticism. He ventured to hope that the time was fast approaching when bills of costs drawn out in detail would be abolished for ever, and that the practice of lawyers being paid upon a scale fixed according to the value of the amount at issue would prevail here as in most of the civilised countries of the world. He believed that most of the taxing masters would only be too

willing to assess the amount, instead of having to exercise their minds by deciding whether this document or that should be less by a folio. He trusted that at some future time he should have the opportunity of moving a resolution with regard to the matter, so that solicitors' costs should be dealt with by an assessed item. He also criticised the issue by the Council of the circular entitled "Observations on Land Registry Memorandum," and hoped that the sort of pin-pricking pamphlets and the statements that were made against the administration of the Land Registry would cease. It had come to stay. (Cries of "No.") He challenged anyone who thought otherwise to look at the building in Lincoln's Inn Fields, which was now being extended, and say if he thought it would ever be abolished. He trusted they would bury their very insignificant little hatchet as soon as possible. He suggested that a proper time to do so would be at one of the Council dinners, and that it might be buried under the dinner table.

LEGAL EDUCATION.

Sir ALBERT ROLLIT, LL.D. (a member of the Council), referring to the remarks of Mr. Ford with regard to legal education, said that Mr. Ford, who had always taken an interest in the subject, was in favour of the co-operation of the Council with the University of London. As a member of the Senate of the University, as were two or three of his colleagues on the Council, he was sure that would be their desire and the desire of the Senate, but he could not help reminding the meeting that, when the school of law was proposed, and was manifestly approved in many quarters, the opposition to, and the destruction of that proposal did not come from the Law Society; but, on the contrary, when it proved impossible, owing to causes which he need not go into, the Society established its own excellent school of law, as it had proved to be, which would form an admirable basis at some time, when it might be more or less identified with the University of London. But he wanted to speak of a practical problem in which the meeting might be very useful, both to the University and to the class of students with whom, he was sure, it would be in the deepest sympathy, he meant the external students of the University. He was strongly in favour of doing everything possible for the students who were not able to spend time and money as internal students, but who could study with the object of taking degrees at the University. The report of the Royal Commission was not in favour of a Faculty of Law, but, if the proper course were taken to unify the action of all the law schools, that would form the best basis of a law school and law teaching, if it were properly dealt with. But, worse than that, the Royal Commission indicated, contrary to the evidence of many who gave evidence before them, that the external degrees, though it did not contemplate destroying them at once, were to receive virtually only a reprieve. He would do his very utmost to retain the external degrees of law students, and other students, of the University. The Council had done its utmost, by establishing a law school and by giving evidence before the Royal Commission and otherwise, to preserve this precious privilege, and he asked the meeting to back that action, to do it practically, and to say that if these degrees for external students were to be abolished they would know the reason why, as he should try to do.

LAND TRANSFER.

Mr. E. T. GARDOM (Gloucester) asked whether the President could give any further information as to the position of land transfer. The report stated that at a meeting in July, 1912, the subject was discussed by delegates from the Provincial law societies and the Land Transfer Committee in conference, and that a resolution was passed, "which was forwarded to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Haldane, who subsequently received a deputation, consisting of the President and vice-President, Mr. Ellett, Mr. Humfrys, Mr. Hills, and Mr. Morton. The interview was confidential, and it is, therefore, impossible to say more than that the Lord Chancellor assured the deputation that the subject of the transfer of land was receiving, and would receive, his most careful consideration, and that he would, in due course, inform the Council of his proposals." He would be glad to know what had happened since.

The President said he would refer to the matter later on.

DELAYS IN GRANTING PROBATES.—CONDITIONS OF SALE.

Mr. GARDOM said that the report also stated that a letter had been received from the Cheltenham Legal Association, complaining of the delays in the issuing of a probate, owing to requisitions by the Estate Duty Department, and that representations had been addressed by the Council to the Senior Registrar of the Probate Division and to the Secretary of the Estate Duty Department. He was a member of the Cheltenham Legal Association, and he should like to know if anything further had been done in the matter. Then the report stated that the attention of the Council had been called to a condition of sale in common use in Cornwall, under which the vendor's solicitor reserved the right to himself to supply a conveyance to the purchaser, and to be paid by him for the work on an *ad valorem* scale, and the action that had been taken. The report further stated:—"The Council have now decided to address a communication to each solicitor practising in Cornwall, pointing out to him the objection felt to the practice by the whole profession, and requesting its abandonment, so that the necessity for legislation may be avoided." He did not know whether anything had come of the communication in question.

The President said, with regard to the delays in granting probate, that the matter was still engaging the attention of the Council, who were in communication with the authorities. As to the question of conditions of sale in Cornwall, the Council had done all they could by

addressing a communication to the solicitors. As regarded the question of land transfer, he had not mentioned the matter because the Council had gone into it in the report, and he knew that Mr. Rubinstein would have something to say with regard to it. He did not wish that there should be any idea that the Council had been at all relaxing their efforts in connection with the matter. The Council had had a good many communications with the Lord Chancellor. They were confidential, and he was not in a position to say anything more upon the subject to-day. He thought that important schemes were in progress, and, possibly before long, something more would be heard of them, but he was not in a position to say more at present. With regard to Mr. Rubinstein's remarks as to the admission of women, he did not know that it was at all a laughing matter, but he presumed that if he had expressed the opinion that women ought to be admitted, he should not have been in consonance with the views of many people. He had expressed the feeling of many when he said they were quite pleased with the result. There were divided views, and he was not at all expressing the opinion of the Council. But the case came on, and the Council had to resist the attempt of these ladies to become members of the profession. If Parliament, in its wisdom, should desire to make a fresh law, he supposed the Council would have to be heard one way or the other upon it, and his own view was that it would be a long time before ladies had that privilege.

A MEMBER asked whether what had been suggested as to the society entertaining the provincial solicitors was likely to be carried out?

THE PRESIDENT said he thought he must leave the matter with the new president. He was sorry that some provincial society had not favoured the society with an invitation. It would have been very unbecoming to have pressed for an invitation.

The motion was carried.

CRYSTAL PALACE.

THE PRESIDENT read a letter from the Lord Mayor inviting contributions to the scheme for securing the Crystal Palace for the nation. He regretted that it was not in the power of the society to devote any of its funds for the purpose, but he had taken the first opportunity of bringing the matter before the members, and the letter would be posted in the hall, and, if any gentlemen would like to contribute to this deserving object, the society would be very glad to receive subscriptions and forward them to the Lord Mayor.

DIVORCE LAWS.

MR. F. BRINSLEY HARPER, C.C. (London), moved, in accordance with notice: "(1) That it is desirable for the advantage of the State, and in the interests of society, that the amendments in the Law of Divorce recommended by both the majority and minority reports should be forthwith carried into law. (2) That having regard to the importance and need of such amendments in the law, the Council prepare and get introduced into Parliament a Bill carrying out such recommendations." He said that no one was able to appreciate the action of the present law more than the members of the society, because they were the persons who came into contact with the people who suffered from its defects, and they knew exactly how very sad the cases were where they were unable to get relief. The Government had declined to take the matter up, but it had not said that if a private Member brought in a Bill it would not give facilities. If Lord Gorell had lived the matter would not have been allowed to stand as it was. Why should not the society take it up? He thought the country law societies would agree with his first resolution, and, as to the second, he should like the Council to get a Bill drafted, and to ask one of their members in the House to bring it up, and to try and get the Government to carry it. It was for the society to take up the legacy left by Lord Gorell, and to try and complete the work he had so much at heart.

MR. PATRICK SHAW (London) seconded the motion.

MR. W. P. FULLAGAR (Bolton) moved the previous question, on the ground that the matter was not one within the province of the society. If the Government would not take the matter up, and if no private Member would do so, surely it was not for the society, formed as it was of a number of members, and with a very strong opinion on both sides against and in favour of divorce, to do so.

MR. W. H. WINTERBOTHAM (London, member of the Council), seconded the motion.

MR. BRINSLEY HARPER spoke in reply.

The "previous question" was carried.

THANKS TO PRESIDENT.

MR. RUBINSTEIN moved a vote of thanks to the president.

MR. SHAW, in seconding the motion, congratulated the president upon his year of office.

The motion was carried with acclamation, and

THE PRESIDENT briefly responded.

The Society of Public Teachers of Law.

The fifth annual general meeting of this society was held on the 4th inst., in the hall of the London School of Economics and Political Science, which had been lent for the purpose by the governors. The chair was occupied by the president of the society (Sir John Macdonell, C.B.); and there was a fair attendance of members.

The annual report having been formally adopted by a unanimous vote, on the motion of Mr. J. G. Pease, seconded by Professor Muri-son, the president delivered his address, in which he urged upon his

hearers the importance of putting their case high, and insisting upon the fact that law was an attempt, however imperfect, to embody ethical rules, and that a study of it revealed, in a way which no other study did, the continuity of national history. The president lamented the change of ideas which had taken place since the days when Locke could speak of the study of law as an essential part of a liberal education, and attributed it largely to a lamentable distrust of the value of jurisprudence in the mind of the ordinary citizen, who saw jurisprudence at work only in the tedious and costly processes of litigation. The only remedy was for teachers of law to bring back their subject to the realities of life, as Blackstone did, and to make the average citizen realize that the object of law was, not to foment quarrels, but to allay them by providing a standard to which both parties could appeal.

At the close of the president's address, the meeting proceeded to the election of officers for 1913-14. On the nomination of the committee, Dr. Bond (Cambridge) was unanimously elected president, Professor Phillips (Leeds) vice-president, Mr. Harold D. Hazeltine (Cambridge) treasurer, and Mr. Edward Jenks (Law Society) hon. secretary. A special committee was appointed to consider and report upon a proposal by Professor Harrison Moore (of Melbourne) for the publication of case-books for the use of teachers of law; after which the members present were entertained to tea by the governors of the school.

Upon resumption, votes of thanks were passed to the honorary auditors and to the governors of the School of Economics and the Court of Saddlers' Company for their hospitality, and the meeting proceeded to consider the chief subject for discussion—viz., the respective provinces of academic and professional education in legal subjects. The discussion commenced with the reading of papers by Professor Kenny (Cambridge) and Mr. M. L. Gwyer (lately tutor of the Law Society), and was continued by various speakers. The meeting closed about 6 p.m.

In the evening the members of the society and their guests, to the number of sixty, dined together in the hall of the Saddlers' Company, which had been lent for the occasion by the court of the company. The Lord Chancellor (Lord Haldane) was the guest of the evening, and the company included, amongst others, the Dean of Manchester, the president of the Law Society (Mr. Trower), the Prime Warden of the Saddlers' Company (Mr. Humphreys), the Registrar of the Admiralty Court (Mr. E. S. Roscoe), the Solicitor to the Board of Customs (Mr. Graham Harrison), and Mr. T. H. Carson, K.C., as well as the officers and members of the committee.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in proposing the toast of "The Society of Public Teachers of Law," spoke of the growing complexity of law and the increasing multitude of authorities, which rendered the old ideal of omniscience impossible, and made it necessary to substitute an adequate grasp of principles. Thus the paths of the judges and the teachers of law were converging, and both had to bring to bear the historical method and the application of first principles. He was profoundly impressed with the necessity of a great change in the training of lawyers, and he was also profoundly impressed with the reality of the new school which was growing up.

THE PRESIDENT, in acknowledging the toast, spoke of the immense services rendered to education in the widest sense by the guest of the evening.

Law Association.

The usual monthly meeting of the directors was held on Thursday, the 3rd inst., Mr. J. W. C. Frere in the chair. The other directors present were Mr. C. F. Leighton, Mr. P. E. Marshall, Mr. J. E. W. Rider, Mr. Mark Waters, Mr. W. M. Woodhouse, and the secretary (Mr. E. E. Barron).

A sum of £119 was voted in relief of deserving cases; two new members were elected, and other general business transacted.

Solicitors' Benevolent Association.

The directors held their usual monthly meeting at the Law Society, Chancery-lane, on the 9th inst., Mr. Richard S. Taylor in the chair; and Messrs. S. P. B. Bucknill, T. S. Curtis, Thomas Dixon (Chelmsford), W. Dowson, J. R. B. Gregory, C. G. May, and B. Tyrwhitt (Oxford) present.

Grants to the amount of £1,200 were made to poor and deserving cases; sixteen new members were admitted, and other general business transacted.

Law Society.

The then president (Mr. C. L. Samson), the vice-president (Mr. W. Trower), and the Council of the Law Society entertained a large company to dinner at the Society's Hall on the evening of the 3rd inst. The following guests were present:—Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, Lord Moulton, Lord Justice Buckley, Lord Justice Kennedy, Sir Samuel Evans, Mr. Justice Pickford, Mr. Justice Astbury, the Hon. H. Lawson, M.P., Sir Thomas Troubridge, Sir Felix Schuster, Sir Thomas Skinner, Sir Edward Troup, Sir Robert Hunter, his Honour Judge Fossett Lock, his Honour Judge Granger, Sir James T. Woodhouse, Sir R. Ellis Cunliffe, Sir William Plender, Mr. J. Lithiby, Mr. A. G. C. Liddell, Baron von Offenheim, Mr. W. Clarke Hall, Mr. Robert

Younger, K.C., Mr. Ralph V. Bankes, K.C., Mr. T. R. Hughes, K.C., Mr. J. D. Walker, K.C., Master T. A. Romer, Mr. W. C. Slaughter, Mr. W. Temple Franks, Mr. L. B. Sebastian, Mr. H. E. Wright, Mr. H. Cassie Holden, Mr. G. E. Cruttwell, Mr. Ivan Levinstein, Mr. M. Luebeck, Mr. Arthur M. Grenfell, Mr. M. S. Myers, Mr. C. Birch Crisp, Mr. Morton Otis, Mr. H. G. Hope, Mr. T. C. Worsfold, Mr. J. G. Bradbury, Mr. C. R. Coward, Mr. W. W. Paine, Mr. J. M. Lightwood, Mr. C. Somers Clarke, Mr. A. E. Cowley, Mr. M. J. Greener, Mr. W. G. Trower, Mr. C. E. Haselfoot, Mr. H. E. Johnson, Mr. A. B. Langridge, Mr. R. A. Wright, Mr. W. Staveacre, Mr. P. H. Hepburn, Mr. J. W. S. Burmester, Mr. Frank Debenham, Mr. D. R. L. Lowe, Mr. H. A. Russell, Mr. Thomas Snow, Mr. F. F. Smith, Mr. E. T. Gardom, Mr. B. W. Mason, Mr. F. Brinsley Harper, Mr. F. W. Biddle, Mr. Michael Brett, Mr. T. H. Weguelin, Mr. J. T. J. Daly, Mr. Ernest Goddard, Mr. H. M. Holman, and Mr. Sinclair.

Legal News.

Changes of Partnership.

Dissolution.

HERBERT WATKIN ROSE, THOMAS KIMBER, and CHARLES CYRIL BRADFORD, solicitors (Bradford & Co.), 6, High-street, Swindon, in the county of Wilts. June 30.

THOMAS CHALLEN GREENFIELD, HENRY MASON, and HERBERT MASON, solicitors (Lindsay, Greenfield, & Mason), 11, Ironmonger-lane, London, E.C., and at Sutton, in the county of Surrey. June 30. The said Thomas Challen Greenfield retires from the said firm and from practice. Such practice will be carried on in the future by the said Henry Mason and Herbert Mason, under the said style or firm of Lindsay, Greenfield, & Mason.

FRANCIS GORDON KNOWLES and CHARLES JAMES DAVIS, solicitors (Chas. Davis, Knowles, & Davis), 10, Ellison-street, in the borough of Glossop. June 16.

ROBERT WILLIAM MERRIMAN and EDWARD LLEWELLYN GWILLIM, solicitors (Merriman & Gwillim), Marlborough, Wilts. Sept. 30, 1912. *[Gazette, July 4.]*

ROBERT NEWBALD KAY and ARTHUR WILLIAM WALKER, solicitors (Newbald, Kay, & Walker), Market-place, Thirsk, in the county of York. Jan. 11. *[Gazette, July 8.]*

Appointments.

The Home Secretary has appointed Mr. ERNLEY BLACKWELL, C.B., to be Legal Assistant Under-Secretary of State in place of Sir Henry Cunynghame, K.C.B., who has retired.

Mr. WILLIAM EDWARD HART has been elected town clerk of Sheffield. Mr. Hart, who was admitted in 1893, has been for the past six years solicitor to the National Telephone Company.

Mr. WALTER TROWER, the newly-elected President of the Law Society, was born in 1853, and is a member of the firm of Trower, Still, Parkin, & Keeling, of 5, New-square, Lincoln's Inn. The history of the firm goes back to the eighteenth century. When Mr. Trower joined it, it was Parkin, Woodhouse, Trower, & Freeling. In 1840 it was known as Metcalfe, Woodhouse, & Metcalfe; in 1820 as Metcalfe & Hanrott; in 1800 as Dunn & Dunn; and previous to 1800 as Wilmot, Lancaster, & Dunn, and its address has been in New-square since 1784, when it was located at No. 3, removing in 1792 to the present address, where it has since remained. In 1902 Mr. Trower was elected on the Council of the Law Society, and shortly afterwards became chairman of the Finance Committee. In 1906 he was appointed a member of the Discipline Committee, and was Vice-President during 1912-13.

Information Required.

JOHN HICKMAN (deceased).—To solicitors and others.—Any person having the custody of, or who can give any information as to, a "will" or other documents of the late "Isaac" or John Hickman, of No. 1, Farquhar-road, Upper Norwood, who died on the 12th of June, 1913, is requested to communicate with F. Stuart Clark, 85, Greenwich-street, London, E.C., Solicitor.

General.

On the 4th inst., the Royal Assent was given to the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Act and a number of Provisional Orders and Private Acts.

At the Middlesex Sessions last Saturday, the court passed a resolution—a few justices dissenting—expressing the opinion that the infliction of corporal punishment would act as a deterrent in cases of indecent assaults on children.

Mr. Edmund Lumley, of Bury-street, St. James's, and of the Middle Temple, barrister-at-law, revising barrister for Nottingham and formerly Recorder of Grantham, joint author of "Lumley's Public Health," left estate valued at £55,173 gross, with net personality £54,960.

At a meeting of the Corporation at the Guildhall on the 2nd inst., it was decided to increase the salary of Dr. F. J. Waldo, the coroner for the city of London and borough of Southwark, from £1,250 to £1,450, that to be the maximum for the work carried out in the City, apart from Southwark, for the salary of which the L.C.C. are alone responsible.

A portrait of Lord Campbell, who was successively Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor, has now been hung in the Council Chamber at Whitehall, where the sittings of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are held. It was painted in 1851 by Mr. Thomas A. Woolnoth, and has been lent from the National Portrait Gallery. With it is hung the portrait of Lord Macnaghten, painted by Mr. H. de T. Glazebrook, and recently presented by Lord Mersey.

In the House of Commons, on the 9th inst., Mr. Weigall asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when the capital expenditure on the national land valuation would cease and the cost of the valuation department be deemed an income expenditure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer: Capital expenditure on the national land valuation, as now being undertaken, should cease in the course of the financial year 1915-16. It is hoped that the cost of the valuation department will then approximate to its permanent annual level.

The grand jury at Staffordshire Assizes on the 3rd inst. made a presentment to Mr. Justice Horridge with reference to the serious number of offences against women and children, suggesting that flogging should be administered in addition to the ordinary punishment. His Lordship, who said he forwarded a similar presentment last year to the Home Secretary, reminded the grand jury that judges had no power to inflict flogging. They were entirely in the hands of the Legislature in the matter. He agreed that cases of this sort were a disgrace to our civilisation. It shocked their common humanity to see so many offences against young children at the assizes. He promised to forward the presentment to the proper quarter.

The Bishop of London, presiding on the 3rd inst. at the fourth day's proceedings of the International Congress for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, at Caxton Hall, said he wanted to bear witness to the good that for twelve or thirteen years the Public Morality Council had done in London in arousing the conscience of the people. They were struggling to get the people of this country to recognize that sixteen was much too young for the age of consent with regard to girls. It was still more monstrous that in our courts, if a man was able to say that he thought the girl was over sixteen, that apparently was taken as a sufficient excuse. It degraded men to be trained up to the idea that a girl of sixteen was "fair game." The age of consent should be raised to eighteen, and he urged the Congress to support that view.

At the annual meeting of the justices of the peace for the county of Middlesex, held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, last Saturday, Mr. Montagu Sharpe was re-elected chairman and Mr. Nield, M.P., deputy-chairman of the sessions for the ensuing year. Mr. Montagu Sharpe said that the hope which he expressed some time ago that the new Guildhall at Westminster would be ready for opening in October had been frustrated by a strike of plasterers, which had held up the plastering work for a month. The architect would report this week when the building would be ready. It was hoped that they would be in the new hall for the November sessions. The King was approached with a view to his performing the opening ceremony, but his Majesty was unable to accede to the request. Prince Arthur of Connaught would perform the ceremony, and at the same time unveil a statue of King Edward VII.

Precedent, says the *Globe*, is strongly against the assertion that the Attorney-General has a traditional right to the Lord Chief Justiceship. During the past hundred years the office has had eight occupants—viz., Lord Ellenborough, Lord Tenterden, Lord Denman, Lord Campbell, Sir Alexander Cockburn, Lord Coleridge, Lord Russell of Killowen, and Lord Alverstone. Only two—Ellenborough and Denman—were promoted direct from the position of Attorney-General. Tenterden was a puisne judge of the King's Bench Division when he was appointed Lord Chief Justice; Campbell was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; Cockburn and Coleridge filled the Chief Justiceship of the Common Pleas; Russell was a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary; and Lord Alverstone was Master of the Rolls. True, all these eight Chief Justices, except Tenterden, occupied the office of Attorney-General at some time or other. That, however, makes it only the more clear that the immediate appointment of Sir Rufus Isaacs to the Lord Chief Justiceship would not be in accordance with precedent.

In the House of Commons, on the 3rd inst., Mr. Ramsay MacDonald asked the Prime Minister whether he would grant time to discuss the motion standing on the order paper in the name of the hon. member for Leicester with regard to certain statements of a partisan and political character made by Mr. Justice Darling in the course of a recent trial. Mr. Asquith: I do not see my way to give facilities from the time at the disposal of the Government for a discussion of the motion referred to. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald: May I ask the right hon. gentleman whether he is aware that an appeal has been entered on account of the remarks to which I have drawn attention, and therefore unnecessary expense is involved on the litigant; whether he remembers a judgment by Lord Macnaghten in the House of Lords in February in which he stated that a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act it may be called on to interpret, and whether steps could not be taken to indicate to Mr. Justice Darling

that he is a judge and not a politician. Mr. Asquith: The fact that the matter is under appeal is an additional reason for not expressing an opinion on the particular case. I am well aware of the judgment of Lord Macnaghten to which my hon. friend has referred, and it seems to me to express admirably and accurately the true character of the judicial position.

Mr. H. Whorlow, writing to the *Times* of the 7th inst., says:—"In a recently-published work on the new Copyright Act reference is made to the 'Berlin Convention,' and this expression was frequently used during the passage of the Copyright Bill through Parliament. From the time that the original international agreement was entered into, in 1887, until its last amendment at Berlin, it was known as the 'Berne Convention,' and the Blue-book issued in 1909 refers to it as the 'Revised Convention of Berne.' The agreement as it stood before its amendment at Berlin was described as 'The Convention of Berne and the Additional Act of Paris.' It would appear, therefore, that the agreement in its latest revised form should still be called the 'Berne Convention,' and the confusion would appear to have arisen through a loose interchange of the words 'Conference' and 'Convention' in references to the Berlin Conference. No better method than a letter to the *Times* occurs to me for clearing away what appears to be a common misconception, and preventing a permanent crystallization of this misnomer."

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Court Papers.

Supreme Court of Judicature.

ROTA OF REGISTRARS IN ATTENDANCE ON				
Date.	EMERGENCY ROTA.	APPEAL COURT No. 1.	Mr. Justice JONES.	Mr. Justice WARRINGTON.
Monday July 14	Mr Bloxam	Mr Church	Mr Jolly	Mr Greswell
Tuesday 15	Jolly	Farmer	Greswell	Church
Wednesday 16	Greswell	Synges	Borror	Leach
Thursday 17	Leach	Jolly	Synges	Borror
Friday 18	Borror	Bloxam	Farmer	Synges
Saturday 19	Goldschmidt	Greswell	Bloxam	Jolly
Date.	Mr. Justice NEVILLE.	Mr. Justice EVE.	Mr. Justice SARGANT.	Mr. Justice ASTBURY.
Monday July 14	Mr Goldschmidt	Mr Synges	Mr Farmer	Mr Leach
Tuesday 15	Bloxam	Borror	Synges	Goldschmidt
Wednesday 16	Farmer	Jolly	Bloxam	Church
Thursday 17	Church	Bloxam	Goldschmidt	Greswell
Friday 18	Greswell	Goldschmidt	Leach	Jolly
Saturday 19	Leach	Farmer	Church	Borror

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE.

SUPPLEMENTARY LIST OF APPEALS FROM ALL DIVISIONS.

Set down to June 25th, 1913.

TRINITY SITTINGS, 1913.

The Appeals or other Business proposed to be taken will, from time to time, be announced in the Daily Cause List.

FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION.

Judgments Reserved.

Appeals.

(General List.)

George May & Co ld v Whiteman
Whiteman v George May & Co
ld (c a v May 6)
Pugh v The Riley Cycle Co & ors
(c a v June 9)
Layland and anr v Boldy & Son
ld (c a v June 19)

APPEALS.

FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION, THE PROBATE, DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION (PROBATE AND DIVORCE), AND THE COUNTY PALATINE AND STANNARIES COURTS.

(General List.)

1912.

In re Ann Maria Smith dec
Trevor v Goodhall (s o generally)

In re Sharp, dec Steward v
Steward (s o Michaelmas)
The Marine Torch Co v Holmes
Marine Life Protection Assoc
Bowden Wire ld v The Bowden
Brake Co ld

In the Matter of the Trade Marks,
Nos. 257,412 and 260,476 in the
name of Bowden Wire ld and In
the matter of the Trade Marks
Act, 1905

J H Andrew & Co ld v Kuchurich

In re an Application by J H
Andrew & Co ld for registration
of a trade mark and In re The
Trade Marks Act, 1905

In re John H Andrew & Cos
trade marks and In re The
Trade Marks Act, 1905

In re Drewell, dec Storr v
Drewell (s o not before July 7)
Teofani and Co ld v A Teofani
In re a trade mark, No 312,065 and
In re The Trade Marks Act,
1905

Simplex Concrete Piles ld v J &
W Stewart
Shropshire and Montgomeryshire
Light Ry Co v The Cambrian
Rys Co



Incorporated
A D. 1720.

Governor,
Sir Neville Lubbock,
K.C.M.G.

**TO
SOLICITORS.**

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THE SECRETARY, ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE, LONDON E.C.

John Brinsmead & Sons ld v
E G S Brinsmead and Wad-
dington & Son ld (to be heard
in Court No. II)
Oram v Hutt and ors
In re Allsop, dec Whittaker v
Bamford and anr
De Lisle v The Union Bank of
Scotland ld and anr
Shanly v Ward and ors
Norton v W H Barker & Son
Farquharson and anr v Dalkeith
(Ceylon) Rubber and Tea
Estates ld and ors
Grose v Briggs and ors
In re James Marke Wood, genr,
dec In re James Marke Wood,
jun, dec Woodehouse v Wood
and ors
Long and ors v Gray and ors
In re The Pershore Baptist Chapel
Nickson and ors v Dolphin
In re Witty, dec Wright v
Robinson and ors
In re Samuel Blow, dec St. Bar-
tholomew's Hospital v Cambden
and ors
In re Cattell, dec Cattell and
ors v Cattell and ors
Companies Winding Up In re
The Companies (Consolidation)
Act, 1908 and In re the London
and Johannesburg Trust Co ld
In the matter of the estate of
Jacob Swinton, dec John
Swinton, dec and anr v Peake
Lowe and anr
Mitchell v Mosley
In the matter of the Midland Ex-
press ld Pearson v The Com-
pany
In re J P Kidston, dec Kidston
v Kidston
In re Charles Kipping, dec Kip-
ping v Kipping
The New Inverted Incandescent
Gas Lamp Co ld v M Howlett &
Co
E Jessop v F R Turner
M A Jessop v F R Turner
In the matter of The Woking
Urban District Council Basing-
stoke Canal Act 1911 1 & 2 Geo
V, Cap c VII
Lyons Son & Co v Gulliver
Tyrell v Whinfield and ors
In re Morrison Jones & Taylor ld
Cooke v The Company
In re A Williams, dec Muirhead
v Gregory
In re Gordon & Adams' contract
and In re the Vendor and Pur-
chaser Act 1874
In re Pritchard's Settled Estate
and In re the Settled Land
Acts 1882 to 1890
In re J T Gray, dec Badger v
Gray
In re M M Mudge, dec and In re
the Settled Land Acts
Eastwood v Ashton
In re H D Marshall, dec, Marshall
and ors v Marshall and ors
Lucas v Hall
In re R Pennington, dec Pen-
nington v Pennington
The British Vacuum Cleaning Co
ld v James Robertshaw & Sons
ld
A G Spalding and Bros v A W
Gamage ld and ors
Dunbar v Harvey
In re C G Spencer's Settlement
Trusts Richmond v Spencer
George Leslie Estates v Russ
In re Martha Bowen, dec Heald
v Dickenson and ors
Gee and ors v Liddell and ors
In re the Companies (Consolida-
tion) Act 1905, and In re the
Premier Underwriting Assoc ld
In re William Rome, dec Mayer
v Rome
In re W R Blackwell Black-
well v Blackwell
Corelli v Gray and ors Same v
Same
The Bowden Brake Co ld v
Bowden Wire ld

**FROM THE CHANCERY AND
PROBATE AND DIVORCE
DIVISIONS.**
(Interlocutory List.)
1912.
Nicholson v Freeland and anr
In re Companies (Winding Up)
Act 1908 and In the matter of
Mines and Commerce ld
Dunbar v Harvey
Tucker v Hayne and anr
Harwood v Hornmuth

Divorce.
Clarke A G A (petnr) v Clarke
G E and Lindsay
Thornhill and anr v Weeks and ors

**FROM THE PROBATE AND
DIVORCE DIVISION.**
(Final and New Trial List.)
1913.
Richard Jones (petnr) v Carrie
Eliza Jones (respt) Sydney John
Martin (co-respt)

**FROM THE COUNTY PALA-
TINE COURT OF LANCAS-
TER.**
(General List.)
1913.
In re Arthur Franklyn dec
Franklyn v Franklyn

FROM THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

(In Bankruptcy.)

In re F C Bounnyman (expte A H Partridge the Trustee v Kingsford, Dorman & Co) No. 1,231 of 1911

In re Richard Abenheim & Co (expte M Jenks the Trustee v Sidney Abenheim) No. 328 of 1912 (s o to July 11)

FROM THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

Judgments Reserved.

(Final List.)

Greenlands v Wilmshurst and ors (c a v April 30)

Asiatic Petroleum Co Id v Lennard's Carrying Co Id (c a v May 30)

R J Lamsden v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (Revenue Side) (c a v June 25)

FROM THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

(Final and New Trial List.)

1911.

McRae v Penman (Gee & Sheen 3rd parties) (s o generally Nov 8) 1912.

Gooda and anr v Drake and anr June 24

The Woodfield Steamship Co Id v the Rio de Janeiro Lighterage Co Id (s o generally)

Royal London Mutual Insee Soc v Kingaland

Temple v Donaldson (s o day to be fixed)

The Egyptian Hotels Id v James Mitchell (Surveyor of Taxes)

Ward and ors v Hill

Charles Wimble, Sons & Co v J Rosenberg & Sons

The King on the prosecution of Neville and anr v The Monmouthshire Compensation Authority (s o not before July 10)

The King, on the prosecution of William Arlidge v Local Government Board (s o for Solicitor-General to fix a day)

Hollis v Barrasford & Curd

Dando v Deely (not before July 22)

Blyth Shipbuilding and Dry Docks Co Id v Adams and anr (not before July 3)

Robinson v Attwood

Holland & Hannen & Cubitts Id v Decies (s o till after hearing of counterclaim)

Blinko v Layton

Baker Street Motor Car Bazaar Id v Marshall

Mehta v Sutton

Hague Bros v H Briggs & Son Id

W Newbold & Co Id v Scriven & Co

Vacuum Oil Co Id v Ellis (Howard Garnishee—Ellison clmt)

Bradford & Sons Id v Bown

Monckton v Pathe Freres Pathephone Id

Bolam (applt) v Allgood (respt)

Norman v Quilter

The National Telephone Co Id v His Majesty's Postmaster-General (Railway & Canal Commission)

His Majesty's Postmaster-General v The National Telephone Co Id (Railway & Canal Commission (s o to be mentioned))

Hiam v Cambrian Ry Co

Crosby & anr v The London General Omnibus Co

Arlidge v Baker Street Motor Car Bazaar Id

Juler v The Tunbridge Wells Gas Co

Monti v Bloch & Klein

Dominy v Beaumont

Upjohn v Willesden Urban District Council

Richards v Wrexham & Acton Collieries

Davies v Same

Bessant & Son v Chatham Empire Id

Jones v Keegan

Ingram & Royle Id v Services Maritimes du Treport Id

In re The London Building Act 1894 Clode v The London County Council

Rome v Rome

Skeate v Slaters Id

Dunlop Tyre Co v Selfridge & Co Id

Lawrence's Stores Id v Wallis & Stevens Id

Attorney-Gen (at the relation of the Mayor, &c of the City of Worcester) v Sharpness New Docks & Co

Hueffer v Illustrated Journals Id

White v Ross & anr

Richards v Turner & anr

Leicester v Dixon

Betts v Curtis & anr

Haas v The Atlas Insee Co Id

In the Matter of the Arbitration Act 1889 and In the Matter of an Arbitration between Wilkinson and The Car & General Insee Corpn Id

The Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Id v New Garage & Motor Co Id

Morrison v London County & Westminster Bank Id

Bestermann v British Motor Car Co and anr

H K Reeves v L M Pope and L M Pope v H K Reeves and ors, by counter-claim

Warner International and Overseas Engineering Co Id v Kilburn, Brown & Co.

Allen v The Great Eastern Ry Co and ors

Gale v Preston

Dickson v J A Scott

Johnson Billington Electricity Meters Id v Billington

In the Matter of an Arbitration between Henry Sidney and The North Eastern Ry Co

Lewis v G Davies (E Davies Clmt)

Warham v Selfridge & Co Id

Metropolitan Water Board v Avery (Widow)

Major & Co Id v John Watt & Co Id

Associated Newspapers Id and ors v The Mayor &c of London

Cointat v T Myham & Son

E V King v Parker

Hollis Bros & Co and ors v Groedel Bros Steamship Co Id and ors

Biddell v Jackson

Hallett v Hughes

Eberhart v Collins

Lonnon v Coppee

Thompson v H & W Nelson Id

Dyer v Steinland

Walter v Whiteman

Jameson v Garlick

Spencers Id v Meyrick

Williams v McCombie

Nelson v James Nelson & Sons Id

Rodocanachi v C J Hambro & Son

Mathew v The Times Publishing Co Id

Chantrey v London Theatres of Varieties Id

Standard Private Finance Co of Ireland Id v Pitman

Cohen v Haynes and ors

Evans v Givendraeth Anthracite Collieries Id

Countess Clarendon v Heydeman

Franklin & Co v Dawson

Holding v Bankes and anr

Reed v London Theatres of Varieties Id

Nightingale v Parsons

Skidmore v Walsh

Mayor, &c., of Gateshead v Lumsden

Morgan v Gray

Crosbie v Beales

In the Matter of an Arbitration between the County Council of the North Riding of Yorkshire and The Middlesbrough County Council

London Trades Shipping Co Id v The Gen Mercantile Shipping Co Id

Reece (trading as J Blake & Co) v Kingsmill and ors

H K Judd & Co Id v London & South Western Bank Id

Crack v Hayward

Hurlstone v London Electric Ry Co and anr

Allis Chalmers & Co v Fidelity Deposit Co of Maryland

Hughes and ors v Fossick

Wolf v R H Halford & Sons Id

Wigmore v Harris

Baum v Stoeck

R Leslie Id v Shiell

Hughes v Roberts

Bown v Cory

Parkyn and anr v Dunbar

The General Estates Co Id v Beaver

Hippolyte Sohn v Kilsby

Smith v South Metropolitan Gas Co

Pilling v South Kirkby, Featherstone and Hemsworth Collieries Co Id

Buckley v Bennett

Streathfield v New Central Omnibus Co Id

Cooper and ors v Crawford

Hardinge v Woodbridge and Flint

Betts v The Yorkshire Insee Co Id and Debenhams Id

Same v Same

In re The Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908 and In re an Arbitration between J Osborne and A W Shaw

Shoerats v Shoerats

Western Electric Co Id v Great Eastern Ry Co

Tucker v Newman and ors

Griffin v Maitland

Societe des Hotels Reunis v Hawker

Hughes v Margett's International Sectional Tyre Co Id and ors

Robinson, Cleaver & Co and ors v Laurence and ors

Bendix v Chilian Syndicate Id and anr

Johnson, Riddle & Co Id v Cowen

Stuart v Meyer & Co

Dixon v Troesan Estates Id

Denyer v Sauter

Burnett v Samuel

Jenkins v Cohen

FROM THE PROBATE, DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION (ADMIRALTY).

With Nautical Assessors.

(Final List.)

1912.

The Charite—1912—Folio 51

The Owners of the Steamship Charits v The Cardiff Ry Co (damage)

The Cambric—1912—Folio 358

The East Asiatic Co Id, The Owners of the Steamship Arabian v W H Cockerline & Co, Owners of Steamship or Vessel Cambric (damage)

The Glasgow—1912—Folio 137

The Owners of the late Steamship Hatfield v The Owners of the Steamship Glasgow (damage)

The Glasgow—1912—H—No. 557—Folio 137

Same v Same (damage)

The Ennisbrook—1912—L—No. 1,057—Folio 399

The Owners of the Steamship Lady Salisbury v The Owners of Steamship Ennisbrook (damage)

The Blazer—1912—Folios 514 and 518

The Berrett Steamship Co Id v The Goole and Hull Steam Towing Co Id (damage)

The SS Marie Gartz—1912—Folio 388

The Owners of Steamship Kaarman v The Owners of the SS Marie Gartz (damage)

The Galileo 1912—1912—Folio 182

The Owners of cargo lately taken on board the Steamship Galileo v Thomas Wilson, Son & Co Id (damage)

The Snowdon Range—1913—Folios 48 and 33

The Owners of the Steamship Welshman and The Owners of the Trawler Salome v The Owners of the SS Snowdon Range, her cargo and freight (salvage)

The Domira—1913—Folio 30

The Commander, Officers and Crew of H.M.S. Melpomene v The Steamship Domira Co Id (salvage)

The Mariana—1912—Folio 325

The Nestle and Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co v The British India Steam Navigation Co Id

The Junio—1912—Folio 503

The Owners of the Dutch Steamship Dordrecht v The Owners of the Spanish Steamship Junio and freight

Without Nautical Assessors.

The Cairnbahn—1912—Folios 11 and 218 (consolidated)

The Owners of Hopper Barges, Nos. 2 and 5 v The Owners of Steamship Cairnbahn and Owners of Nunthorpe (damage)

(Interlocutory List.)

The Okehampton—1912—Folio 98

Robert MacAndrew & Co v The Owners of the Steamship Okehampton (damage)

The Cairnbahn—1912—Folios 11 and 218 (consolidated)

The Owners of the Hopper Barge No. 205 v The Owners of SS Cairnbahn and The Owners of the Steam Tug Nunthorpe (damage) (s o until No. 1 Final (without assessors) disposed of)

The Tartan—1913—Folio 167

The Owners of SS Newa v The Book Co Id and Cassel & Co Id Owners of Steam Trawler Tartan (damage)

FROM THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

(Interlocutory List.)

1911.

Clark v Forster

Same v Same

Forster v Aldridge
In re H Forster (expte J Jackson
Clark, in Bankruptcy) (s o till
after action before Parker, J)
1912.

The King v Justices of the
County of London and ors
(expte Stanley) (s o generally)

The King v Justices of the
County of London and ors
(expte the London County
Council) (s o generally)
1913.

Bright v Vidal (s o with liberty to
apply)

Birmingham and Midland Motor
Omnibus Co ld v London and
North Western Ry Co

Scott v Burton

Sturges v The Countess of War-
wick

Forbes v Samuel (s o until further
order May 28)

Waverley Book Co ld v J Nelson
& Son (by original Action) and
J Nelson & Son v Waverley
Book Co ld and Cassell & Co ld

Waverley Book Co ld v J Nelson
& Son (by original Action) and
J Nelson & Son v Waverley
Book Co ld and Cassell & Co ld

Burnett v Samuel

Detmar v L E Thorman & Co and
anr

Williams v The Weston-super-
Mare U D C

Fresco v Anglo-Eastern Trading
Co

IN RE THE WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION ACTS, 1897 AND 1906.
(From County Courts.)
1912.

Tomlinson v Garratts ld

Jones v Penwyllt Dinas Silica
Brick Co ld

Burnell v Owners of Ship Parana
1913.

Edwards (Widow) v The Wing-
ham Agricultural Implement Co
ld

Smith v Foster

Low v Port of London Authority

Gill v N Fortescue & Sons ld and
anr

Silk v Isle of Thanet Rural Dis-
trict Council

Wilmerson v Lynn and Hamburg
Steamship Co ld

Rogers v B Whitehouse & Sons

Hewitt v Stanley Bros

McCabe v Henry North & Sons ld

Snelling v Norton Hill Colliery Co

The Tyne Tees Shipping Co ld v
Whitlock

Dyhouse v Great Western Ry Co

Brady v Canadian Pacific Ry Co

Frank Webber v Wansbrough
Paper Co ld

Casey v Humphries
Brown v George Kent ld
Wray v Taylor Bros & Co ld
Clarkson v Charente Steam Ship
Co ld and ors

Calico Printers Assoc ld v Booth
Same v Same

Lewis v Stanbridge

Smith v Cope

Buls v Owners of Ship Teutonic

Marshall v Sheppard

Ogden v The South Kirkby,
Featherstone and Hemsworth
Colliery ld

Cheverton v Oceanic Steam Navi-
gation Co ld

Stroewer v Aerogen Gas Co

Binns v Kearley & Tonge ld

Walton v Tredegar Iron and Coal
Co ld

Howarth v A Knowles & Sons ld

Morris v Turford & Southward
Broforst v The Owners of the
Steamship Blomfield

Brown v Kemp

Howards v Wharton

Birks v The Stafford Coal and
Iron Co ld

Richardson v Denton Colliery Co
ld

Guisti and anr v Port of London
Authority

Frank Smith v Frederick W Hor-
lock

Beddard v Stanton Ironworks Co
ld

Pears and ors v Gibbons and ors

Sanderson v Parkinson & Sons ld

Davies v Crown Perfumery Co

Brewer v Smith

Olson (pauper) v Owners of Ship
Dorset

Green v Cammell, Laird & Co ld

Ferriter v Port of London
Authority

New Moncton Collieries ld v
Toone

McNally v Furness, Withy & Co

Dight v Owners of Ship Craster
Hall

Ralph v Mitchell

James v Mordey, Carner & Co ld

Small Bros & Co v Fowler

Rivitt v Holdings & Guest (1908)
ld

Trump v Martin

Ciarke, Nicholls & Coombs ld v
Knox

Woods v T Wilson & Sons & Co ld

Dougal v Westbrook

Bradley and ors v Wallace's ld

(Thompson, McKay & Co ld 3rd
parties)

Blant v The Outwood Collieries ld

Smith v Hardman & Holden ld

Smart v Newburys ld

Black and anr v The New Zealand
Shipping Co ld

Gas Economising and Improved
Light Syndicate v Blanchard
Lamp Patents Co

Aisenstein v Maikop Apsheron Oil
Co (not before July 10)

Hacker v Gilson (s o)

Ashton v Mitchell

Hales v Gibbons (s o to July 1)

Morris v Evans (not before July
1)

Smith v Smith (not before July
1)

Horton's Estate ld v Crockford,
Grove & Sons ld (not before
July 1)

Bebb v Law Soc

Leon v Slomnicki (s o)

In re Ridout, dec

Ridout v Ridout

Litholite v Travis

In re the Copyright in a Design
granted to Cook and Bern-
heimer Co (No. 447,698 of 1905)

and In re the Patent and De-
signs Acts, 1883 to 1907 motion

Rose v Chesham U D C (not
before July 1)

Bury v Guest

Maunder v Gale

Clarke v Baku Standard Agency
ld

King v Brown, Durant & Co

Basitica Syndicate v Lovell

Marconi v Helsby Wireless Tele-
graph Co (not before July 15)

F Hewthorn & Co ld Howe

In re Rothwell, dec

Birch v Rothwell

Exchange Telegraph Co v Green-
wood's Exchange

Wood v Mayor, etc, of Conway

Robbins v Olivey

Chambers v Derham

Theeman v Borrough's Adding
Machine ld

Burt v Bird

Garrick v Garrick

Thompson v Cockill

Blois v Clarke

Ashby St Ledgers v Talbot

Gordon v Power

Inglis v Collis

Shattock v Kershaw

Higgins v Sagar

In re Hiller, dec

Hiller v Hiller

Thomas v Hughes

In re J H Matthews, dec

Satchwell v Matthews

Jenkins & Co v Thomas and John
Brocklebank ld

Libraco ld v Shaw-Walker ld

Martin v Whittin

Palmer v Gilbert

In re L T Green's Settlement

Reversion Purchase Co ld v Carr

In re Evison, dec

Fawcett v Evison

Heron v Varney

In re W Featherstone, dec

Morris v Featherstone

Appenrodt v The London County
Council

Whitworth v Hallat

Lloyd v Shadwell

Ray Mead Hotel ld v Montagu

Ferne v Gortitz

Before Mr Justice WARRINGTON.
Retained Matters.

Causes for Trial (with Witnesses).

Napier v Rudge-Whitworth ld
pt hd (s o generally)

In the Matter of Letters Patent
granted to Valdemar Poulsen,
No. 8,961 of 1899, and In the
Matter of the Patents and De-
signs Act, 1907

In the Matter of Letters Patent,
No. 26,671 of 1906, granted to
George Albert Smith, and In
the Matter of the Patents and
Designs Act, 1907 (s o not
before July 4)

(From Mr Justice SWINFEN
EADY's List.)

In re W G Probyn, dec

Probyn v Drayton (s o generally)

Grosslicht v Patent Protection
Assoc ld (not before July 1)

Actions for Trial (by order).
(With Witnesses.)

Bradley v Pope and anr pt hd

In re John Lewis, dec

Mitchell v Hunt (without plead-
ings) (for July 1)

Roberts v Weeks and Cooper ld

The Ramsgate and St Lawrence
Coffee Tavern Co ld and ors v
Mawby and anr

Petitions.

Hampton v Holman (s o liberty to
apply to restore)

Barnes v Stewart (s o generally)

In re Henry Gibbs' Trustee
(restored)

Causes for Trial Without Wit-
nesses and Adjourned Summonses.

In re P Collings, a Solr and In re
Taxation of Costs (s o)

In re Nicholas Kendall, an infant
adjd sumns (s o)

In re Letters Patent, No. 18,898
of 1904 and In re Patents and
Design Act, 1907 (s o leave to
amend)

In re Ernest Edward Street, dec

Vevers v Holman (s o liberty to
amend)

In re Wollett, dec Bate v
Wollett (s o until further
order)

In re Henry Smith, dec

Tingle v Smith (s o generally)

In re Isaac Robinson

Robinson v Robinson (s o
generally)

In re McCausland and King's
Contract and In re The Vendor
and Purchaser Act, 1874 (s o
July 1)

In re William Mayell, dec

Foley v Ward

Smith v Australian Mining Gold
Recovery ld (s o generally)

In re Ann French, dec

Digby v The Glamorgan and Mon-
mouthshire Mission to the Deaf
and Dumb

In re West, dec

Westhead v Aspland

In re James Yates, dec

Morris v Yates

National Air Gas Co v Glasscoe
adjd sumns

In re C G J Ponsonby, dec and In
re L F C Ponsonby, dec

Royds v Ponsonby

In re G T M Messiter-Terry, dec

Parry v Attorney-Gen

In re Bent, dec

Harrison v Sparks

The Stamford, Spalding and Bos-
ton Banking Co ld v Keeble

In re C Shurey, dec

Shurey v Shurey

In re Samuel's Settled Estates

In re Settled Land Acts, 1882 to
1890

In re Samuel's Settlement

Samuel v Micholls

In re Archer Hind, dec

Dunn v Archer Hind

In re E O'Connor Terry, dec

Strachan v Terry

Saunders v Saunders

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE—CHANCERY DIVISION.

TRINITY SITTINGS, 1913.

SUPPLEMENTARY LIST OF CHANCERY CAUSES FOR TRIAL OR HEARING.

Set down to June 25th, 1913.

Before Mr. Justice JOYCE.

Retained Petition.

In re Archibald Arrol & Sons ld

Adjourned Summonses.

In re Bennett, dec

Weatherill v Gutteridge pt hd
(s o)

In re Gidley, dec

Thornton v Bathurst

In re Watson, dec

St. dolf v Watson

Causes for Trial (with Witnesses).

Jackson v Cording (s o generally)

In re Fellows, dec

D'Arcy v Corker (not before
Michaelmas)

In re Burton, dec

Burton v Burton pt hd (s o
until liberty to restore.

In re Wilkinson's Settlement)

Kay v Kay (not before July 1)

Central Sumatra Rubber Estates

ld v Central Industrial Trust ld

John Vipond & Co ld v The Blee-
navon Co ld

Elven v Lawson (s o)

In re McHardy, dec
McHardy v McHardy
In re Stiff, dec
Stiff v Stiff
In re Dora Lomas, dec
Worthington v Lomas
In re Gurden, dec
Gurden v Gurden
In re J P Thimann, dec.
Thimann v Thimann
In re Thomas Hoadley Hebden,
dec
Spence v Gaskaith
In re G E Monckton's Settlement
Monckton v Monckton
In re Trust Deed, dated July 7,
1887
In re Trustee Act, 1835
Agg-Gardner v Lord Harris
In re W Bickley, dec
Linscott v Linscott
In re The Estate of F Embury,
dec
Page v Bowyer
In re Ann Haley, dec
Watson v Watson
In re Edith de C Wright dec
Findlay v Wright
In re William Eady's Trusts
Clay v Borlase
In re Holden's Settlement Eliot
v Holden
In re Hester Whitfield dec
Whitfield v Whitfield
In re Charles West dec Moody
v Elphick
In re John Martin dec Martin v
Martin
The Woolwich Equitable Building
Soc and anr v Escare and ors
Union of London and Smith's
Bank v Slowman and ors
In re Abraham Phillips, dec
Wood v Lawrence
In re Howard Thorpe Fellows,
dec Lane v Felton

Before Mr. Justice NEVILLE.
Causes for Trial (with witnesses).
Anglo-Westphalian Kent Coal-
fields Id v Sidders
Kent Coal Concessions Id v
Sidders (fixed for July 9)
Hastie v East Grinstead U D C
(July 2)
Sobey v Sainsbury (July 23)

Further Consideration.
In re T James dec Styles v
James
In re Jane Lewis, dec Price v
Rees
In re John Wakefield, dec Read
v Williams
In re S Bakewell (spinster), dec
Gibbons v Smith
Causes for Trial without Wit-
nesses and Adjourned
Summonses.
In re Margaret Ogilvie's Estate
In re Settled Land Acts, 1882
to 1890 (s o generally)
In re G Wood, dec Wood v
Wood
In re Barry's Settlement Smart
v Yeo
In re Wright, dec Wright v
Draper (s o)
In re H F G Coleman's Trusts
Toller v Pochin pt hd (s o)
In re Gough Gough v Gough
(s o)
Etheridge v Heath
Morris v Silverton
In re J G Lewis, dec Public
Trustee v Tucker
Spencer v Buxton Lime Firms Co
ld
In re John Shaw, dec Shaw v
Knight
In re F Stocken, dec Jones v
Hawkins Bruce v Garrett

Harden v Bullett
In re Marsden's Will Trusts Searl
v Smith
Millar v Searl
In re W Charlton's Trusts In re
B F Charlton's Trusts Charlton
v Cartwright
In re Oulton's Settlement Croase
v Oulton
In re Bertrand Heald, dec
Skeate v Willis
In re Thomas Williams, dec Wil-
liams v Richards
In re Lindsay Lindsay v Ayrton
In re Bourne & Jones' Contract
and In re the Vendor and Pur-
chaser Act
In re J Ambrose's Estate Live-
ing v Ambrose
In re L L Sitwell, dec Worsley
v Sitwell
In re J M Allen Trevor v
Daniell
In re W Mann, dec Head v
Stuart
In re Zarifi, dec Zarifi v Ionides
Stratton v Simmonds
In re B W Crawhall's Estate
Grant Smith v Newall
In re C A Becket, dec Purnell
v Paine
In re Barron Hall v Barron
In re Dearmer, dec Davson v
Dearmer
In re F J Moore, dec Streetfeild
Moore v Bigg
Hilton v Tuley
In re Henderson Froom v Froom
In re Jephson Moore-George v
Jephson
Seeley v Irving
In re Thomas Watson, dec Burt
v Watson
In re Hawkins, dec Hawkins v
Argent
In re The Companies (Consolida-
tion) Act 1908 and In re the
Cameron's Colonial Products Id
In re J Jacobs' Trusts and In re
the Judicial Trustee Act 1896
In re W Tattersall, dec Lund v
Jamieson
In re G Wilkinson, dec Green
v Ribchester

Before Mr. Justice EVE.
Cause for Trial (with Witnesses).
Howard Asphalt Troughing Co Id
v The Co-operative Wholesale
Soc Id
Motion (with Witnesses).
Met. Rifle Range Co Id v Billing
(July 15)

Further Considerations.
In re Blackmore's Settlement
Follett-Croom v Candy (not
before July 8)
In re R Champion, dec Champion
v Champion (s o generally)
Causes for Trial without Wit-
nesses and Adjourned
Summonses.
In re J G Goddard, dec Goddard
v Goddard (s o)
Weiss v Mayor & Co of Birmingham
(s o generally)
In re W D Badger, dec Badger
v Badger (s o generally)
In re Coombs Joslin v Coombs
(restored) (s o generally)
In re Mitchell's Estate Spofforth
v Mitchell (s o)
In re A B Wootton, dec Wootton
v Hullard (s o generally)
In re Corsellis, dec Berney v
Corsellis (s o)
In re W—, an infant (in
camera) (s o not before July 21)

Ray v La Compagnie de Mayville
In re Ralph Dodds, dec Dodds-
Parker v Philipson
In re W Newbould, dec Ander-
ton v Newbould
In re Duke of Manchester's
Settled Estates Buccleuch v
Manchester
In re J A Shipley, dec Middleton
v Mayor & Co of Gateshead (not
before July 1)
In re J A Rix, dec Rix v Rix
In re Thomas Johnson's Estates
and In re The Settled Land
Acts
In re C A Evans, dec Mayne v
Waller
In re Mark Pierson, dec Pierson
v Pierson
In re Sarah Farmer, dec Hall v
Burkinshaw
In re Fowler's Marriage Settle-
ment Hutchinson v Fowler
In re F H Thompson, dec Arn-
strong v Parson
In re Weston, Clevedon & Portis-
head Light Ry and In re the
Ry Cos Act, 1867
In re T W Groom, dec Groom v
Osborne
In re Brown Cuthbertson v
Brown
In re Whitwell's Settlement
Whitwell v Walker
Yeates v Fisher
Scott v Scott
Hilhouse v Shenhouse
Scott v Scott
Doyle v Brightlinea U D C
Watkins v Newton
In re Alfred Cross, dec Cross v
Cross
In re Lord Newton's Settled
Estates and In re Settled Land
Acts
In re Walford's Settlement Wal-
ford v Walford
In re Wellstead, dec Rose v
Wellstead
In re P A Raland, dec Bonner v
Raland
In re S A Ramsey, dec Chambers
v Newburn
In re Ashburnham, dec Mar-
tineau v Ashburnham
In re H Hall, dec Rides v Hall
In re J R Troup, dec Tweedie v
Prescott
In re C B Smith's will Griffith v
Daniell
In re F C Griffith Phibbs, dec
Phibbs v Daniell
Ray v Flower-Ellis
In re E W Rotch, dec Dayman v
Rotch
In re G A Wedgwood, dec
Randall v Poole
In re J J Grinlinton, dec Public
Trustee v Grinlinton
In re W Barnes, dec Dudeney v
Dove
In re Clifford, dec Clifford v de
Pinna
In re De Noailles, dec Tufnell
v Shephard
G Meadows, dec Meadows v
Meadows
In re Wallace, dec Wilkes v
Bone
Clark v Dunn
Douding v Whish
In re Maria Knight's Estates and
In re the Settled Land Act,
1882
In re Lemale, dec Boniface v
Boy Scouts' Assoc
Bowden v Bowden
In re C St John, dec St John v
Roberts
In re W B Ocha's Settlement Ocha
v Ocha

In re R W Osmont, dec Wetjen
v Osmont
In re J R Ward, dec Colman v
Rayner
Dauncey v Probert
In re Edward Norman, dec
Norman v Norman (s o)
In re H C Jobson, dec Jobson v
Jobson
In re Watts' Settlement Jones v
Fenning
In re Claremont Claremont v
Bastard
In re Arthur Cummings, dec
Cummings v Cummings
In re J M Laycock, dec Laycock
v Laycock
In re C Lock, dec Blake v
Jeffery
In re G Harper, dec Amos v
Miles
In re Murphy, dec Hatten v Cox
In re Cox v Hatten
In re J W Wilson, dec Russell v
Wilson
In re Crawshaw Crawshaw v
Crawshaw
In re S W Kelly, dec and In re
Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890
Griffiths v Kelly
Pink v J A Sharwood & Co Id
In re Butler, dec Butler v Butler
In re A Arnold, dec Arnold v
Arnold
In re Brown Brown v Dickard

Before Mr. Justice SARGANT.
Retained by Order.
Actions (with Witnesses).
From Mr. Justice SWINFEN
EADY'S List.
Natural Color Kinematograph Co
ld v Speer and Rodgers (s o
generally)
Booth v Williamson (s o generally)

Causes for Trial (with Witnesses).
Columbia Government v Colum-
bian Emerald Co Id (s o)
Pengelly Manuell v Higgs
Mendelssohn v Traies & Son (s o
pending settlement)
In re M S Cooper, dec Reeder v
Curtis and ors (s o until further
order)
In re Kenrick & Jefferson's
Patent No. 6,629 of 1903 (s o
for amendment of specification)
Mills v Grundherr (s o liberty to
apply to restore)
Brown v Brown (not before
October 18)
Mercedes Daimler Motor Co Id v
John Marston Id (s o not before
trial of another action by same
pliff) (s o generally)
Barnes v Goldfinch (stayed for
security)
Neame v The Siberian Syndicate
Id (s o Michaelmas)
Naunton and ors v Whitehouse
(s o)
Goodhind v Bexon (s o until
further order)
Mansell v The Tirdonkin Collieries
Id (s o further order)
W A Sanders v Geo S Ferdinando
Geo S Ferdinando v W A
Sanders (consolidated) (s o
generally)
Gabb v Richards and ors (s o
generally)
Hughes v Evans (s o generally)
Hydroil Id v Joseph Crossfield &
Sons Id (s o Michaelmas)
Carter v du Cros (s o generally)
Holmes v Ferdinando Schulze v
Ferdinando (s o July 10)
In re G T Congrieve, dec Moxon
and ors v Dransfield (s o
generally)

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Birchall v Crisp & Co and ors
(s o July 7)
Tattersall v Ravenscroft (s o
generally)
Omnium Insee Corpn ld v The
United London and Scottish
Insee Co ld and anr
The West Bromwich Corpn v
Beyley (not before July 10)
Lafitte v William Whiteley ld (to
be heard by Warrington, J)
The Commissioners of Works v
King (s o for day to be fixed)
Warner and ors v Reeves and anr
Omnium Electric Palaces ld v
Baines & Heussler
Hall v Gorton
Bedford v Leeds Corpn (for July
7, subject to anything pt ld
Wright and ors v Wright and anr
(not before July 22)
Lepard v Leighton
Brodrick v Shepherd-Cross (not
before July 14)
In re Rosalie Broadbridge, dec
Broadbridge v Owles
In re Oddie, dec Oddie v Oddie
(not before June 30)
Andrews & ors v Hiller & anr
(not before July 1)
Burleigh v Kershaw (not before
July 7)

Before Mr. Justice ASTBURY.
Causes for Trial (with Witnesses).
Morse v The Garnant Anthracite
Collieries ld (not before
Michaelmas)
Garnant Anthracite Collieries ld
v Morse (not before Michael-
mas)
Gordon v Wells (not before
July 1)
Roan v Roan (not before Michael-
mas)
James Keith & Blackman Co ld v
The Tilley High Pressure Gas
Syndicate ld
In re Hopkins, dec Streeter v
Dyer
The Sealomatics (Parent) Syndi-
cate ld v Pakeman
Fetheridge v Heath
Austin v Union Bank of Scotland
(with witnesses) (June 30)
Allen v Allen
Petzold v Phillips
In re J O Bowling, dec Bowling
v Bowling
Hewett v Peach

The Braxton Syndicate ld v Ware
The Tin & Trading Co of Nigeria
ld v Jackson
Menchen v Elite Sales Agency ld
Lawson v Lawson
In re Elizabeth Burrage, dec
Bake v Burrage
Leaning v Pearl Life Assee Co
Pearl Life Assee Co v Densham
& ors
Ickringill v Holmes (s o Michael-
mas)
De Bathe v Jenkins
Hue v Foster
Adams v King
Evershed & Vignoles ld v Paul
Morrell v Stodd & Millington
Williams v Williams
Same v Same
Drage v Drage
Omnium Electric Palaces ld v
Baines
Metropole Hotel Co (Minehead) ld
v Wilson
In re Gledhill, dec Gledhill v
Beaumont
Maycock v Bell
Parker v Young
Milbourne v Lyons
Pearson v Richard Wade Sons &
Co ld
Taylor v Willey
Hodgson v Borrett (with wit-
nesses)
Munday v South Metropolitan
Electric Light & Power Co
Same v New Gutta Percha Co ld
Harris v Lurin
In re Philip Keen, dec Keen v
Mirams
Lemmens v Everett, Edgcumbe &
Co ld
David Lloyd Pigott & Co v F J
Coles & Co
Latham v Negus
In re J Scutt, dec In re Josias
Croad, dec In re E Kellaway,
dec Scutt v Ensor
Goodwin, Ferreira & Co ld v Leite
Moon v Pople
Fowler v Carter
In re Ruth Drake, dec Coulston
v Stimson
Jones v Davies
Walshe v Moylett's Stores ld
The Natural Colour Kinematog-
raph Co ld v Somersall & Co
Dove v Weber
Blumson v Coldham & Birkett
Robins v Robins

Winding-up Notices.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

London Gazette—FRIDAY, July 4.

CHARLES J FORWARD AND SON, LTD.—Petn for winding-up, presented July 1, directed to be heard July 15. Miller & Co, Stephen's chambers, Telegraph st, solrs for the petr. Notice of appearing must reach the above named not later than six o'clock in the afternoon of July 14.

CONTRACTORS, LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION).—Creditors are required, on or before July 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to H. T. McConville, 65, London Wall, liquidator.

DONCASTER ELECTRICAL CO, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before July 21, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Albert E. Stringer, Manor row chambers, Bradford, liquidator.

HUMBER SLATE WORKS CO, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before August 5, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Edmund Francis Norman, 19-21, Queen Victoria st. Rolitt & Co, Hull, solrs for the liquidator.

J. A. CONNELLY & CO, LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION).—Creditors are required, on or before August 15, to send in their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to James Henry Boulter, The Promenade, Cheltenham, liquidator.

PROXIM VETERINARY SUPPLIES, LTD. (IN LIQUIDATION).—Creditors are required, on or before July 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John William Hinks, 115 and 117, Colmore row, Birmingham, liquidator.

TRINIDAD OIL AND FUEL CO, LTD.—Petn for winding-up, presented July 1, directed to be heard July 15. Dale, 6, South sq, Gray's Inn, solrs for the petr. Notice of appearing must reach the above named not later than six o'clock in the afternoon of July 14.

W. H. RICHMOND, LTD.—Petn for winding-up, presented June 24, directed to be heard at the County Court House, Victoria st, Blackburn, July 28 at 10. Duckworth, 23, Richmond ter, Blackburn, solrs for the petr. Notice of appearing must reach the above named not later than six o'clock in the afternoon of July 27.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

London Gazette—TUESDAY, July 8.

F. B. K. SYNDICATE, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Aug 16, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Alfred Green, 53, New Broad st, liquidator.

PREMIER UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before July 29, to send their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to F. G. van de Linde, 4, Fenchurch av, liquidator.

SMITH, LAURIE, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before July 29, to send their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to Alfred James Mair, 3, Manor pl, Sunderland. Ellis, solrs for the liquidator.

STAFFORDS (MANCHESTER), LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION).—Creditors are required, on or before Sept 1, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Ellis Green, Cromwell bidge, Blackfriars st, Manchester, liquidator.

Resolutions for Winding-up Voluntarily.

London Gazette—FRIDAY, July 8.

LONDON AND EASTERN COTTON, LTD.
GILDENBURGH BRICK CO, LTD.
TOM KERSHAW & SONS, LTD.
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SOCIETY, LTD.
CONTRACTORS, LTD.
ROBERT TANNED LEATHER CO, LTD.
NORFOLK SQUARE HOTEL, LTD.
OYEX FUEL CO, LTD.
ST. LEONARDS ARCHERY GARDENS CO, LTD.
JULIAN K. NEEDY, SAHLIN & CO, LTD.
COLON GOLD MINES, LTD.
INAMBARI—SYNDICATE, LTD.
HELLESPOINT, LTD.
W. A. BARRETT, LTD.
COLLEN MILLS CO, LTD.
JOHN FEILMANN & CO, LTD.
SHUTTLEWORTH BLEACHING CO, LTD.
ATHEFTON NEW CLUB HOUSE CO, LTD.
TWIN LAKES PLACERS, LTD.
MANCHU SYNDICATE, LTD.

London Gazette—TUESDAY, July 8.

BRIGHTON MANUFACTURING CO, LTD.
ENGLISH ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE, LTD.
THETFORD MOTOR CO, LTD.
UNITED STONE FIRMS, LTD.
PHILIP ELLIOTT, LTD.
L. G. HALL & CO, LTD.
HOLMES, SIMMONDS & CO, LTD.
STAFFORDS (MANCHESTER) LTD.
G. C. MILNES, VOSS & CO, LTD.
MURA SYNDICATE, LTD.
SOMERSET, DORSET AND DEVON DAIRY CO, LTD.
ANGLO-NORWEGIAN ALUMINIUM CO, LTD.
HORNHILL CO, LTD.
RIVERSIDE TRUST CO, LTD. (Amalgamation).
RIVERSIDE ORANGE CO, LTD. (Amalgamation).
BRITISH FEATHER CO, LTD.
ALFRED DUNHILL, LTD.
JOHN TATTERSFIELD AND SONS, LTD.
WHITE STAR TAXIS, LTD.
B. K. SYNDICATE, LTD.

Creditors' Notices. Under Estates in Chancery.

LAST DAY OF CLAIM.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, July 1.

FIRMINGER, FERDINAND LEOPOLD, Doctor Johnson's bldgs, Temple, Barrister-at-Law
Ang. 6 Robson v Wolseley, Warrington, J. Goddard, Clement's inn, Strand.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, July 4.

JACOBS, FRANCES, Southend-on-Sea July 14 Jacobs v Jacobs, Joyce and Eve, JJ.
Ayers, 61, Carey st, Lincoln's-inn.

The Property Mart.

Forthcoming Auction Sales.

July 15.—Messrs. FAREBROTHER, EVIS & Co., at the Mart, at 2: Freehold Residences (see advertisement, back page, June 25).

July 15.—Messrs. THURGOOD & MARTIN, at Guildford, at 2: Country House and Land (see advertisement, page 11, June 25).

July 15.—Messrs. WEATHERILL & GREEN, at the Mart, at 2: Freehold Ground Rent (see advertisement, page 14, July 5).

July 15.—Messrs. HAMPTON & SONS, at the Mart: Freehold Estate (see advertisement, page 11, July 5).

July 17.—Messrs. H. E. FOSTER & CRAWFORD, at the Mart, at 2: Reversions and Annuity, &c. (see advertisement, back page, this week).

July 21.—Mr. WM. HOUGHTON, at the Mart, at 2: Freehold Building Site (see advertisement, page 11, June 21).

July 21.—Messrs. DENHAM, TEWSON & Co., at the Mart, at 2: Freehold Property (see advertisement, page 11, June 25).

July 22.—Messrs. HAMPTON & SONS, at the Mart: Country Residence (see advertisement, back page, this week).

July 23, 29, 30, 31.—Messrs. HUMBERT & FLINT, at the Mart: Freehold Estates and properties (see advertisement, front page, May 31).

July 23.—Messrs. THURGOOD & MARTIN, at the Mart, at 2: Freehold Town House and Freehold Ground Rents (see advertisement, page 654 July 5, and back page this week).

July 29.—Messrs. REYNOLDS & EASON, at the Mart, at 1: Improved Rental (see advertisement, back page, this week).

ABBEY, ALBERT, Gordon st, Plalstow, Woollen Merchant Sept 9 Long & Co, Bedford
TUN
ASHTON, JOHN CHARLESWORTH, Penlstone, nr Sheffield, Farmer July 26 Dransfield &
Hodgkinson, Penlstone
BATTISCOMBE, Major WILLIAM WILSON, Ashburton, Devon July 25 Tucker & Son,
Ashburton
BEHRENS, WALTER LIONEL, Manchester, Merchant Aug 25 Farrar & Co, Manchester
ROOT-ROD, MARTHA ANN, Huddersfield Aug 5 Sykes, Huddersfield
BORROUGHS, ROBERT, Rusholme, Manchester, Licensed Victualler Aug 22 Whitworth,
Manchester
BURGESS, JAMES, St Leonards on Sea Aug 18 Collins & Collins, Kinz William st
WIMBORNE, ELIAS, Ryepon, Herts Aug 14 Worthen & Co, Ryepon
CHAPLIE, BENJAMIN WORSLEY, Shepherds Hill, Highgate Aug 31 Chandler & Co,
New st, Lincoln's inn
CLOUGH, SARAH ANN, Bradford Aug 8 Wright & Co, Shipley
COCK, JOE, Lockwood, Huddersfield, Cab Proprietor Aug 5 Sykes, Huddersfield
CUNDET, MARY, Southcote, Leic Aug 5 Birt & Co, Leic Aug 5
DOUGLAS, SIR ARTHUR LEICHT, G.C.C., G.C.V.O., Winchfield, Hants Aug 9 Radcliff
& Hood, Craven st
FIRTE JOHN BATES, Birky, Huddersfield, Stone Mason Aug 5 Sykes, Huddersfield
GARTSIDE, AMELIA, Southport Aug 18 Brighouse & Co
GILL, WILLIAM, Sutton, Surrey Aug 11 Adams, Victoria st
GILLESPIE-ADDISON, ROSALIE MIDDLETON, Crowborough Aug 6 Baker & Nairne
Crosby 82

GLASS, CHARLES JOHN, Worthing Aug 16 Bell & Co, Sutton, Surrey
 GOODRICE, JOHN FORTMAN, Edgbaston, Birmingham, Rope Manufacturer Aug 9
 COCHRAN & Son, Birmingham
 GREEN, JAMES, Leigh, Worcester, Farmer Aug 25 Roberts, Worcester
 GREGG, ROBERT JOHN, Sandown, 1 of W, Aug 8 Jonas, Carey at
 GRIMSTON, EDWARD JOHN, Dartmouth rd, Willesden Aug 9 Guscotte & Co, Essex st,
 Strand
 HAIGH, ELEANOR, Kingston upon Hull Aug 20 Farrell, Hull
 HARPER, WALTER, Broadbury villas, Willesden, Coal Merchant Aug 6 Franklin,
 Oxford
 HARRISON, NICHOLAS, Waddington, Yorks July 31 Briggs, Padiham
 HART, ELIZABETH, Exeter rd, Broadbury Aug 4 Rye & Eys, Golden sq
 HAYTHURST, JAMES, Waddington, Yorks, Weaver July 31 Briggs, Padiham
 HAYWARD, JANE, Westbourne, Bournemouth Aug 4 Lacey & Son, Bournemouth
 HINCHCLIFFE, CHARLES, Barnsley, Pork Butcher Aug 7 Ridsdale & Son, Barnsley
 ILLINGWORTH, THOMAS, Chatburn, Lancs July 31 Briggs, Padiham
 JENNINGS, HENRY BENJAMIN, Rugby July 30 Reddish, Rugby
 LAKE, EMILY, Stephen's cres, Westbourne Park Aug 14 Peake & Co, Bedford row
 MACARTNEY, ANNA SOPHIA, Thurloe sq, Kensington Aug 30 Stevens & Drayton, Bond
 st, Waltham
 MAJOR, ELIZABETH, Clifton, Bristol Aug 7 Bevan & Co, Bristol
 MAWSON, HELEN, Headingley, Leeds Aug 8 Piercy, Leeds
 MITCHELL, JOHN, Falmouth, Engineer Tool Maker July 26 Moore & Shepherd,
 Halifax

NOTE: Miss SARAH CATHERINE, Torrington sq, Holborn Aug 6 Torr & Co, Bedford
 row
 OGILLY, JOHN FRANCIS, Cornhill, Merchant Aug 23 Oliver & Lyall, Cornhill
 ORRELL, WILLIAM, Quariton, nr Bolton Aug 8 Orrell, Manchester
 OSSELEY, AUGUSTA MARIA, Torquay Aug 15 Baileys & Co, Berners st
 PEAT, JOHN, South Shields, Pilot July 30 Hannay & Hannay, South Shields
 PIGOTT, JAMES ROBERT, King William st, Greenwich Aug 1 Rodgers & Co, Wallbrook
 PIZZES, JAMES, Wightman rd, Hornsey Aug 30 Howse & Eve, Salters Hall et
 PLUMMER, HENRY, Fareham, Hants, Builder Aug 15 Goble & Warner, Fareham
 POTTER, EDWARD THOMAS, Dresden, Longton, Staffs July 19 Patterson, Longton
 RUSSELL, RICHARD, Small Heath, Birmingham Forthwith Morgan & Box, Cardiff
 WILLIAMSON, MARY ANN, 20 Bennett & Co, Moorgate st
 SHEPHERD, WILLIAM, Aspall, nr Wigan, Bricklayer July 26 Gibson, Wigan
 SIM, HELEN, Brighton Aug 15 Barker & Co, Bedford row
 SUMMERLAND, WILLIAM JAMES, Penn, Staffs Aug 18 Evans, Walsall
 SYMONDS, HENRY, Park-tone, Dorset, Solicitor Aug 12 Symonds & Sons, Dorchester
 TREES, THOMAS, Gargrave, nr Skipton, Yorks July 28 Charlesworth & Wood,
 Skipton
 TROTTER, JOHN, Brickenden, Herts Aug 16 Druces & Attlee, Billiter sq
 WHEELER, SAMUEL, Reading, Builder Aug 30 Witherington, Reading
 WILLIAMSON, MARY ANN, Queen's gt, Kensington Gore Aug 11 Potter & Co, Queen
 Victoria st
 WYBORN, WALTER EDWARD, Camden rd Aug 16 Barnard & Taylor, Lincoln's Inn fields
 YOUNG, JAMES, West Stanley, Durham, Shiftsman Aug 5 Crerar, Maryport

Bankruptcy Notices.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, July 1.
 ADJUDICATIONS.

THOMAS, JOHN, Cathays, Cardiff, Contractor Cardiff Pet
 June 25 Ord June 25
 VICKERS JOHN CURTIS, Didsbury nr Manchester, In
 surance Agent Manchester Pet June 26 Ord June
 26
 WALTERS, JANE REWES, Swansea, Fruiterer Swansea
 Pet June 27 Ord June 27
 WEYMAN, ERNEST, Corringham rd, Golder's Green, Up-
 holsterer High Court Pet June 23 Ord June 23
 WHITE, CHARLES, Barlow, Derby, Licensed V. etualier
 Chesterfield Pet June 26 Ord June 26
 WOLF, CHARLES, Kilburn sq, London, Jeweller Croydon
 Pet April 14 Ord June 23
 WRIGHT, WILLIAM FRANCIS, sen, Brancaster Staithes,
 Norfolk, Builder Pet June 27 Ord June 27
 YATES, EDWARD HENRY, Barcombe av, Streatham Hill,
 Hostler's Manager Wandsworth Pet June 27 Ord
 June 27

Amended Notice substituted for that published in the
 London Gazette of May 27:

JOHN, CARL GUSTAV CHRISTIAN, Stroud Green rd, Butter
 Dealer High Court Pet April 24 Ord May 22
 ADJUDICATION ANNULLED.

WARDE, WILLIAM ARMITAGE, Leeds, Grocer Leeds
 Adjud July 23 1901 Annul June 23

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, July 4.
 RECEIVING ORDERS.

BALKE, HUGO, Sheffield, Razor Grinder Sheffield Pe
 July 2 Ord July 2
 BASK, JEMIMA CECILIA, Cambridge park, Wanstead High
 Court Pet July 2 Ord July 2
 BECKETT, JABEZ, Steeple Claydon, Bucks, Haulier Banbury
 Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 BROCKLEBANK, ELIZABETH, Staveley, Westmorland
 Kendal Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 BROCKLEBANK, THOMAS, Staveley, Westmorland, Farmer
 Kendal Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 COLLIS, DAVID, Manselton, Swansea, Fruiterer Swansea
 Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 COOMBS, FRANCIS, English B cknor, Glos, Builder Newport,
 Mon Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 DAVIS, WILLIAM, Downs rd, Clapton, Millinery Manu-
 facturer High Court Pet June 4 Ord July 1
 DEAN, RACHEL SUSAN, York York Pet June 30 Ord
 June 30
 ELLWOOD, EMMA, Selby, Yorks Sheffield Pet July 2 Ord
 July 2
 FAWCETT, HARRY NEWTON, Stockton on Tees, Clerk
 Middlesbrough Pet July 1 Ord July 1

FLOYD, FRANK RUST, King's Lynn, Norfolk, Coal Merchant
 King's Lynn Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 GORDON, HERBERT MOORE, Chard, Somerset Exeter
 Pet May 31 Ord July 1
 HOLMES, JOHN, Sheffield, Grocer Sheffield Pet July 2
 Ord July 2
 IMMISSON, ALDERNON FREDERICK, Swinton, nr Rotherham,
 Joiner Sheffield Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 LYNCH, EDWARD, Alwyne pl, Canonbury, House Property
 Dealer High Court Pet May 23 Ord July 2
 MACKAY, JOHN F, Charing cross High Court Pet June 9
 Ord July 2
 MAT, CHARLES, Lel-h on Sea, Essex, Builder Chelmsford
 Pet May 21 Ord June 30
 MAZZA, MOISE, Aldermanbury, Shipper High Court Pet
 May 14 Ord July 2
 MERRILL, NOKI RADCLIFFE, Sheffield, Insurance Broker
 Sheffield Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 ORGILL, HARRY, Sheffield, Grocer Sheffield Pet July 2
 Ord July 2
 PHILP, JAMES, Charterhouse st, Butcher High Court Pet
 June 7 Ord July 2
 POPA, CHARLES JAMES, Northampton, Brewer North-
 ampton Pet July 1 Ord July 2
 READ, WILLIAM JOHN, Cefn C-ed, Brecknockshire, Hosier
 Merthyr Tydfil Pet June 20 Ord June 30
 ROBERTS, EDWARD HUGHES, Llandysilio, Montgomery,
 Grocer Newtown Pet June 30 Ord July 2
 ROBERTS, FREDERICK, Ashton on Ribble, nr Preston,
 Assistant Cotton Mill Manager Preston Pet June 30
 Ord June 30
 STOKES, GEORGE ALFRED, Sheffield, nr Walsall, Butcher
 Walsall Pet June 28 Ord June 28
 TRENCHARD, WILLIAM DAVIS, Exeter, Umbrella Maker
 Exeter Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 WEARMOUTH, JOSEPH, Earning Castle, Durham, Corn
 Merchant Stockton on Tees Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 WHITE, FRED, Halwill, Beaworthy, Devon, Saddler Barn-
 staple Pet July 2 Ord July 2
 WHITEWOOD, GEORGE ABRAM, and WILLIAM HENRY
 WHITEWOOD, Greenwich market, Fruit Salesmen
 Greenwich Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 WILLIAMS, LEONARD, Llanauno, Radnor Leominster
 Pet May 22 Ord July 2

Amended Notice substituted for that published in the
 London Gazette of June 13:

WHITE, CHARLES, Westcliff on Sea High Court Pet
 June 11 Ord June 11

FIRST MEETINGS.

BARRADELL, PERCY RUSSELL, Newport, Mon, Outfitter
 July 12 at 11 Off Rec, 141, Commercial st, Newport,
 Mon
 BASK, JEMIMA CECILIA, Cambridge pk, Wanstead July 15
 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Calfs head, Essex
 CLARKE, HARRY, Leamington Spa, Warwick, Motor Car
 Manufacturer July 14 at 3 Off Rec, 8, High st,
 Coventry

DAVIES, WILLIAM, Downs rd, Clapton, Millinery Manu-
 facturer July 15 at 1 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey at
 DEAN, RACHEL SUSAN, York York July 15 at 3-15 Off Rec,
 The Red House, Duncombe pl, York
 EDWARDS, ROBERT, Caerau, nr Maesteg, Colliery Labourer
 July 12 at 11 117, St. Mary st, Cardiff
 EYFON, GEORGE HENRY, Liverpool, Stationer July 15 at
 11 Off Rec, Union Marine bldgs, 11, Dale st, Liverpool
 KAY, ALFRED, Pemberton, Wigan, Bricklayer July 15 at
 11 Off Rec, 19, Exchange st, Bolton
 KILBURN, GEORGE, Richmond, Yorks, Cattle Dealer July
 15 at 11.30 Off Rec, Court chmbrs, Albert rd, Middles-
 brough
 LYNCH, EDWARD, Alwyne pl, Canonbury, House Property
 Dealer July 14 at 1 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey at
 MACKAY, JOHN F, Charing cross July 14 at 12 Bank-
 ruptcy bldgs, Carey at
 MAZZA, MOISE, Aldermanbury, Shipper July 14 at 11.30
 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey at
 MIDGLEY, JOSEPH, Colton, Yorks, Farmer July 15 at 2.15
 Off Rec, The Red House, Duncombe pl, York
 NUTTALL, WILLIAM, Wombwell, nr Barnsley, Boot
 Repairer July 14 at 10.30 Off Rec, County Court Hall
 Regent st (Basigate entrance), Barnsley
 OVERTON, ROBERT OCHIL, Oakhill ct, Putney July 16 at
 11.30 182, York rd, Westminster Bridge rd
 PHILP, JAMES, Charterhouse st, Butcher July 16 at 12
 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey at
 RADAGE, WALTER, East Kirkby, Notts, Miner July 15 at
 11.30 Off Rec, 4, Castle pl, Park st, Nottingham
 READ, WILLIAM JOHN, Cefn C-ed, Brecknockshire,
 Hosier July 14 at 12 Off Rec, County Court, Town
 Hall, Merthyr Tydfil
 ROBERTS, FREDERICK, Ashton on Ribble, nr Preston,
 Assistant Cotton Mill Manager July 14 at 11 Off Rec,
 13, Winckley st, Preston
 STOKES, GEORGE ALFRED, Sheffield nr Walsall, Butcher
 July 15 at 12 Off Rec, 38, Lichfield st, Wolverhampton
 VALLANCE, WALTER, Faversham, Butcher July 12 at 12
 Off Rec, 68A, Castle st, Canterbury
 WHITTAKER, JOHN, Accrington, Grocer July 14 at 11.30
 Off Rec, 13, Winckley st, Preston
 WRIGHT, CLARENCE GEORGE, Maidstone, Furniture
 Dealer July 12 at 12.30 Off Rec, 68A, Castle st,
 Canterbury
 YATES, EDWARD HENRY, Barcombe av, Streatham Hill,
 Hostler's Manager July 16 at 11 132, York rd, West-
 minster Bridge rd

ADJUDICATIONS.

BALKE, HUGO, Sheffield, Razor Grinder Sheffield Pet
 July 2 Ord July 2
 BARTLETT, FRANCIS GEORGE CONINGSBY ASHMEAD,
 Queen's Gate ter High Court Pet Feb 22 Ord June 30
 BECKETT, JABEZ, Steeple Claydon, Bucks, Haulier
 Banbury Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 BEHRMANN, EMIL, Kingsway House, Kingsway, Portrait
 Maker High Court Pet Mar 14 Ord July 1
 BROCKLEBANK, ELIZABETH, Staveley, Westmorland
 Kendal Pet June 30 Ord June 30

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APPLY FOR PROSPECTUS.

BROCKLEBANK, THOMAS, Staveley, Westmorland, Farms Kendal Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 CAMPBELL, L. Mount st, Director of Public Companies High Court Pet April 10 Ord June 30
 COOMES, FRANCIS, English Brickworks, Glos, Builder Newport, Mon Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 CORBRIDGE, WILLIAM (deceased), Higher Walton, nr Preston, Biscuits Dealer Preston Pet May 9 Ord June 30
 DEAN, RACHEL SUSAN, York York Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 ELWOOD, EMMA, Sheffield Sheffield Pet July 2 Ord July 2
 EYSON, GEORGE HENRY, Liverpool, Stationer Liverpool Pet June 5 Ord June 30
 FAWCETT, HARRY NEWTON, Stockton on Tees, Clerk Middlesbrough Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 HOLMES, JOHN, Sheffield, Grocer Sheffield Pet July 2 Ord July 2
 HUNT, JAMES, Bradford, Licensed Victualler Bradford Pet June 11 Ord June 30
 IMISON, ALGERNON FREDERICK, Swinton, nr Rotherham Joiner Sheffield Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 MERRILL, NOEL RADCLIFFE, Sheffield, Insurance Broker Sheffield Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 MIDGLEY, JOSEPH, Colton, Yorks, Farmer York Pet June 24 Ord June 28
 OROILL, HARRY, Sheffield, Grocer Sheffield Pet July 2 Ord July 2
 POPE, CHARLES JAMES, Northampton, Brewer Northampton Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 READ, WILLIAM JOHN, Osn Cod, Brecknockshire, Hosier Merthyr Tydfil Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 ROBERTS, FREDERICK, Ashton on Ribbles, nr Preston, Assistant Cotton Mill Manager Preston Pet June 30 Ord June 30
 SOULEBY, NORMAN, Blyth, Northumberland, Plumber Newcastle upon Tyne Pet June 23 Ord June 27
 STOKES, GEORGE ALFRED, Sheffield, nr Walsall, Butcher Walsall Pet June 23 Ord June 23
 TILLEY, HENRY JOHN, Westcliff on Sea, Engineer Chislehurst Pet May 19 Ord June 19
 TRENCHARD, WILLIAM DAVID, Exeter, Umbrella Maker Exeter Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 WEARMOUTH, JOSEPH, Barnard Castle, Durham, Corn Merchant Stockton on Tees Pet July 1 Ord July 1
 WHITE, FRED, Halwill, Beaworthy, Devon, Saddler Barnstaple Pet July 2 Ord July 2
 WHITEWOOD, GEORGE ABRAHAM, and WILLIAM HENRY WHITEWOOD, Greenwich market, Fruit Salesmen Greenwich Pet July 1 Ord July 1

Amended Notice substituted for that published in the London Gazette of June 13:

WHITE, CHARLES, Westcliff on Sea High Court Pet June 11 Ord June 11

ADJUDICATION ANNULLLED AND RECEIVING ORDER RESCINDED.

LAWRENCE, FREDERICK WILLIAM PETHICK, Red Lion t, Fleet st High Court Pet April 26 Rec Ord May 14 Adjnd June 11 Resc & Annul July 2

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, July 8.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

BALMFORTH, WILLIAM HENRY, Huddersfield, Fork Butcher Huddersfield Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 BELL, FREDERICK STEPHEN, Aston, Birmingham, Clothier Birmingham Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 BISSETT, WALTER, York, Baker and Confectioner York Pet July 5 Ord July 5
 BOULEY, FAUSTIN MARCEL, Elizabeth st, Westminster, Physician High Court Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 BRADBURY, WILLIAM, Derby, Painter Derby Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 COLBORNE, ARTHUR JOSEPH, Swindon, Bailor Swindon Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 CORNELL, FRANKLIN, The Haymarket High Court Pet June 6 Ord July 1
 DOLBY, GEORGE, Thornton le Dale, Yorks, Journeyman Taylor Scarborough Pet July 5 Ord July 5
 GANNON, RICHARD, Hastings, Fruit Hawker Hastings Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 GARDNER, DOROTHY, Qendon, Essex, Spinster Cambridge Pet April 11 Ord June 21
 GOODACRE, LAVINIA ANN, Falkingham, Lincoln Peterborough Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 HALL, WILLIAM HENRY, Leeds, Grocer's Manager Leeds Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 HARROP, ARTHUR, New Mills, Derby, Coal Merchant Stockport Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 HUGHES, FREDERICK CHARLES, Penny Compton, Warwick, Baker Warwick Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 JACKSON, W. J., Wansstead, Essex, Builder High Court Pet June 7 Ord July 4
 JACKSON, WILLIAM OUGHTON, Mostyn av, Wembley Hill, Tobaccoist High Court Pet July 5 Ord July 5
 JAMES, HENRY, Redruth, Cornwall, Licensed Hawker Truro Pet July 5 Ord July 5
 JOBBER, HARRY, Willenhall, Staffs, Boot Maker Wolverhampton Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 KIRO, ARTHUR W., Raynes Park, Surrey Kingston, Surrey Pet June 13 Ord July 3
 LEBECLEY, JOHN AUGUSTUS, West Heath drive, West Hampstead, Commercial Traveller Barnet Pet July 7 Ord July 7
 NIXON, JOHN, Lemington, Moreton in Marsh, Glos, Farmer Banbury Pet May 24 Ord July 4
 ROGERS, HARRY, Stradbroke, Suffolk, Harness Maker Ipswich Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 SKETCHLEY, FRANK HORSMAN, Nottingham, Teacher of Music Nottingham Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 WHATTON, ALBERT HENRY, Newcastle under Lyme, Staffs, Iron Merchant Hanley Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 WHITTAKER, JOHN, Acerrington, Grocer Blackburn Pet June 25 Ord June 25

WORRELL, GEORGE, Great Grimaby, Fish Merchant Great Grimaby Pet July 3 Ord July 3

Amended Notice substituted for that published in the London Gazette of June 27:

LOWNESE, FRANCIS WHITE, Wealdstone, Middx, Dairyman St Albans Pet May 31 Ord June 25

RECEIVING ORDER RESCINDED.

JONES, ALFRED ENOCH, Hardworth, Birmingham Birmingham Pet Mar 29 Rec Ord April 23 Res July 4

FIRST MEETINGS.

BELL, FREDERICK STEPHEN, Aston, Birmingham, Clothier July 16 at 11.30 Ruskin chmbrs, 191, Corporation st, Birmingham
 BELL, WILLIAM MOORE, Ringwood, Hants, Poultry Farmer July 17 at 12.45 Off Rec, City Chambers Catherine st, Salisbury
 BOULEY, FAUSTIN MARCEL, Elizabeth st, Westminster, Physician July 17 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
 COLLIS DAVID, Manselton, Swanses, Fruiterer July 16 at 11.30 Off Rec, Government bldgs, St Mary's st, Swansea
 CORNELL, FRANKLIN, Haymarket July 17 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
 DOLBY, GEORGE, Thornton le Dale, Yorks, Journeyman Tailor July 16 at 4 Off Rec, 45, Westborough, Scarborough
 FAWCETT, HARRY NEWTON, Stockton on Tees, Clerk July 17 at 12 Off Rec, Court Chmbrs, Albert rd, Middlesbrough
 GANNON, RICHARD, Hastings, Fruit Hawker July 16 at 2.30 Off Rec, 12A, Marlborough pl, Brighton
 HASCOCK, CHARLES FREDERICK, Sheffield, German Silver Manufacturer July 16 at 12.30 Off Rec, Figtree ln, Sheffield
 HINE, THOMAS WILLIAM, ARTHUR HINE, and ROSIE HINE, Wantage, Berks, Farmers July 17 at 12 Off Rec, 1, St. Aldate st, Oxford
 IMISON, ALGERNON FREDERICK, Swinton, nr Rotherham, Joiner July 16 at 12 Off Rec, Figtree ln, Sheffield
 JACKSON, W. J., Wansstead, Essex, Builder July 16 at 11 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
 JACKSON, WILLIAM OUGHTON, Mostyn av, Wembley Hill, Tobaccoist July 16 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st
 JOBBER, HARRY, Willenhall, Staffs, Bootmaker July 16 at 12 Off Rec, 30, Lichfield st, Wolverhampton
 KING, ARTHUR W., Raynes Park, Surrey July 16 at 12 132, York rd, Westminster Bridge rd
 MERRILL, NOEL RADCLIFFE, Sheffield, Insurance Broker July 16 at 11.30 Off Rec, Figtree ln, Sheffield
 NURSALL, WILLIAM, Sandiway, Derby, Farmer July 16 at 3 Off Rec, 4, Castle pl, Park st, Nottingham
 POPE, CHARLES JAMES, Northampton, Brewer July 18 at 12 Off Rec, The Parade, Northampton
 ROBERTS, EDWARD HUGHES, Lladysaillo, Montgomery, Grocer July 16 at 2.30 Law Society's Room, College hill, Shrewsbury
 ROBINSON, GEORGE THOMAS, Batley Carr, Drewsbury, Dyer July 16 at 3 Off Rec, Bank chmbrs, Corporation at Dewsbury
 ROGERS, HARRY, Stradbroke, Suffolk, Harness Maker July 23 at 2.30 Off Rec, 36, Princess st, Ipswich
 THOMAS, JOHN, Cathays, Cardiff, Contractor July 18 at 12 117, St Mary st, Cardiff
 THOMPSON, FREDERICK GEORGE, Wisbech, Cambridge, Bazaar Proprietor July 16 at 3 Off Rec, 8, King st, Norwich
 TRENCHARD, WILLIAM DAVID, Exeter, Umbrella Maker July 16 at 11.30 Off Rec, 9, Bedford circus, Exeter
 WALTERS, JANE REEVES, Swanses, Builder July 16 at 11 Off Rec, Government bldgs, St Mary's st, Swansea
 WEARMOUTH, JOSEPH, Farnard Castle, Durham, Corn Merchant July 17 at 11.30 Off Rec, Court chmbrs, Albert rd, Middlesbrough
 WHITE, CHARLES, Barlow, Derby, Licensed Victualler July 17 at 11 Off Rec, 4, Castle pl, Park st, Nottingham
 WHITE, FRED, Halwill, Beaworthy, Devon, Saddler July 22 at 11 Off Rec, 9, Bedford circus, Exeter
 WHITEWOOD, GEORGE ABRAHAM, and WILLIAM HENRY WHITEWOOD, Greenwich market, Fruit Salesmen July 18 at 11 132, York rd, Westminster Bridge rd

ADJUDICATIONS.

BALMFORTH, WILLIAM HENRY, Huddersfield, Fork Butcher Huddersfield Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 BARRADELL, PERCY RUSSELL, Newport, Mon, Outfitter Newport, Mon Pet June 9 Ord July 3
 BAZE, JEMIMA CECILIA, Wansstead, Essex High Court Pet July 2 Ord July 4
 BELL, FREDERICK STEPHEN, Aston, Birmingham, Clothier Birmingham Pet July 4 Ord July 5
 BISSETT, WALTER, York, Baker York Pet July 5 Ord July 5
 BOULEY, FAUSTIN MARCEL, Elizabeth st, Westminster, Physician High Court Pet July 4 Ord July 7
 BRADBURY, WILLIAM, Derby, Painter Derby Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 CARYER, FRANK RICHARD, Farnborough, Hants, Surgeon Dentist Guildford Pet May 28 Ord July 1
 COLBORNE, ARTHUR JOSEPH, Swindon, Builder Swindon Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 COLLIS DAVID, Manselton, Swanses, Fruiterer Swansea Pet June 30 Ord July 3
 DAVIES, WILLIAM, Downs rd, Clapton, Millinery Manufacturer High Court Pet June 4 Ord July 4
 DOLBY, GEORGE, Thornton le Dale, Yorks, Journeyman Tailor Scarborough Pet July 5 Ord July 5
 GANNON, RICHARD, Hastings, Fruit Hawker Hastings Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 GAY, ALBERT, Birmingham, Engineer Gloucester Pet May 28 Ord July 2
 GOODACRE, LAVINIA ANN, Falkingham, Lincoln Peterborough Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 HALL, WILLIAM HENRY, Leeds, Grocer's Manager Leeds Pet July 4 Ord July 4

HARROP, ARTHUR, New Mills, Derby, Coal Merchant Stockport Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 JACKSON, WILLIAM OUGHTON, Mostyn av, Wembley Hill, Tobaccoist High Court Pet July 5 Ord July 5
 JAMES, HENRY, Redruth, Cornwall, Licensed Hawker Truro Pet July 5 Ord July 5
 JOBBER, HARRY, Willenhall, Staffs, Boot Maker Wolverhampton Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 KRETZSCHMAR, CURT ROBERT, Kingly st, Regent st, Wholesale Furrier High Court Pet June 2 Ord July 3
 LOCKHART, LIEUT B S, Belgum, India High Court Pet April 3 Ord July 2
 REES, HERBERT FREDERICK, Southsea, Hants Portsmouth Pet June 3 Ord July 1
 ROBERT, EDWARD HUGHES, Llandysaillo, Montgomery, Grocer Newtown Pet June 20 Ord July 5
 ROGERS, HARRY, Stradbroke, Suffolk, Harness Maker Ipswich Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 SKETCHLEY, FRANK HORSMAN, Nottingham, Teacher of Music Nottingham Pet July 3 Ord July 3
 SPONG, ARTHUR HENRY, Bodlione, Valley, Anglesey Bangor Pet May 27 Ord July 3
 WHATTON, ALBERT HENRY, Newcastle under Lyme, Iron Merchant Hanley Pet July 4 Ord July 4
 WHITTAKER, JOHN, Acerrington, Grocer Blackburn Pet June 25 Ord June 25
 WILLIAMS, JOHN, and JANE WILLIAMS, Bethnal Green rd Choemongers High Court Pet May 22 Ord July 4
 WORRELL, GEORGE, Great Grimaby, Fish Merchant Great Grimaby Pet July 3 Ord July 3

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